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ABSTRACT
The classic question in international law concerns its effectiveness. Today, this old debate concerns the usefulness of treaties. Yet
those engaging in this debate share a common problem. They
evaluate treaty success by focusing on the effects of treaties on one
type of actor: states. This narrow lens is misguided; it leads to a
skeptical view of the effectiveness of treaties because of the number of countries declining to negotiate, adopt, ratify, or enforce
treaties.
This article challenges this skeptical view by introducing the
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concept of “treaty penumbras” to explain how even treaties rejected by state actors exert considerable effects on the actions of an
important non-state actor: transnational businesses. This article
identifies three types of penumbral effects: pre-emption, coordination, and noise. Pre-emption effects encourage businesses to upgrade their self-regulation when a treaty is imminent. Coordination effects galvanize business actors to support (or oppose) treaty
norms, and noise effects increase external pressure for corporate
reform. Each of these effects magnifies the reach of treaties over
businesses but these effects are unnoticed in the traditional legal
framework that prioritizes state behavior.
Penumbral effects have important policy and academic implications. National policymakers, individually and collectively, increasingly target corporate transgressions globally, such as human
rights abuses, environmental contamination, and financial misconduct. Treaties are designed to address these very problems but are
increasingly limited in doing so under the traditional “statist”
framework. In contrast, this article offers strategies for operationalizing penumbral effects to reach corporate conduct through treaty regulation. For academics, penumbral effects necessitate reevaluation of both the criteria used for evaluating the effectiveness
of treaties and the conclusions reached under that evaluation.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The classic question in international law concerns its effectiveness, especially concerning the use of treaties. Those engaging in
this debate tend to evaluate treaty success by focusing on the effects of treaties on one type of actor: states.1 In contrast, this article
introduces the concept of treaty penumbras to explain how treaties
exert effects on non-state actors—effects that are generally unnoticed in both academic and political circles.2 Treaty penumbras necessitate a re-evaluation of how international legal scholars measure a treaty’s success and the conclusions reached under such
evaluation.
For treaties affecting business activity, a treaty’s penumbra refers to its indirect effects on corporations and other business enterprises. Although penumbral effects may influence the behavior of
other non-state actors, this article focuses on the effects on business
actors because their conduct is increasingly the subject of treaty
regulation.
Traditionally, states were the relevant audience for treaties because most treaty obligations concerned state behavior: waging
war, reducing tariffs, claiming territory, punishing war crimes, exploring space, etc. But today’s global problems are not the fault of
states alone. Global businesses pollute waterways,3 employ slave
1
Shima Baradaran et al., Does International Law Matter?, 743 MINN. L. REV.
743, 747 (2013) (“[T]he current theories of international law inappropriately concentrate on states rather than individuals.”).
2
This article is part of a broader conversation regarding the role of private
actors within international law. Recent scholarship in this area has focused on the
role of private actors in international law-making. See, e.g., Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 237 (2015) (discussing the “internationalized” power of contract); Melissa Durkee, Persuasion Treaties, 99 VA. L. REV. 63,
109 (2013) (discussing the importance of aligning stakeholder interests with treaty
goals for “persuasion treaties”); Paul Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 VA.
L. REV. 1573, 1595–1617 (2011) (discussing participation by private actors in “upstream” and “downstream” law production). But see Baradaran et al., supra note
1, at 765 (discussing the motivations of private actors to comply with international
law).
3
See Clifford Krauss, Big Victory for Chevron Over Claims in Ecuador, N.Y.
TIMES (March 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/05/business/federaljudge-rules-for-chevron-in-ecuadorean-pollution-case.html
[https://perma.cc/
P5L9-YA2R] (reporting allegations against Chevron); Laura Smith-Spark, Farmers
Sue Oil Giant Shell Over Niger Delta Pollution, CNN (Oct. 24, 2012),
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labor,4 and cheat government regulations,5 to name a few recent
transgressions. Therefore, when evaluating a treaty’s success, it is
important to understand and account for a treaty’s effects on these
businesses actors.6
The ways that treaties affect businesses are surprising. The familiar story is that treaties command businesses only when they
first command states that, in turn, command businesses; treaties do
not command businesses directly. Unfortunately, this chain of
command is breaking down in the 21st century. States may be less
willing to create treaties.7 When they do sign a treaty, domestic
legislatures often resist ratification. Many treaties have died in the
United States Senate.8 When this occurs, a treaty cannot reach
http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/11/world/europe/netherlands-nigeria-shell-oil/
[https://perma.cc/S855-BPKF] (reporting pollution allegations against Shell).
4
Edvard Pettersson & Robert Burnson, Nestle Accused of Putting Fish from
Slave Labor in Cat Food, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2015-08-27/nestle-accused-of-putting-fish-from-slave-labor-in-catfood [https://perma.cc/6J5P-2G7J] (“Nestle SA was sued over claims that its Fancy Feast cat food contains fish from a Thai supplier that uses slave labor.”).
5
Vanessa Houlder, Vincent Boland & James Politi, Tax Avoidance: The Irish
Inversion, FIN. TIMES: COMMENT (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/
d9b4fd34-ca3f-11e3-8a31-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/2NK9-WKLA] (discussing mergers between U.S. companies and foreign companies in order to lower
tax rates).
6 See Baradaran et al., supra note 1, at 801–16 (assessing rates and reasons for
corporate compliance with financial transparency laws).
7 See Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel & Jans Wouters, When Structures Become Shackles: Stagnation and Dynamics in International Lawmaking, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L.
733, 734–75 (2014) (collecting data from official sources—including the United Nations, the United States, and other sovereign governments—that suggests multilateral treaty-making is “stagnating”).
8 See Associated Press, US Senate Rejects UN Treaty on Disability Rights Amid
GOP Opposition, GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2012/dec/04/senate-rejects-un-treaty-disability [https://perma.cc/Y8Y7A4W2] (demonstrating an instance of this when the United States Senate declined
to ratify the UN Convention on Persons with Disabilities). See also Lisa Baldez,
U.S. Drops the Ball on Women’s Rights, CNN (March. 8, 2013) http://
www.cnn.com/2013/03/08/opinion/baldez-womens-equality-treaty/ [https://
perma.cc/8UN8-8CUK] (noting that the United States is only one of seven UN
member nations that has failed to ratify the U.N. Convention to Eliminate All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women); David D. Caron, The U.S. Must Ratify
the Law of the Sea Treaty, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/05/19/global-priorities-in-the-arctic/
the-us-must-ratify-the-law-of-the-sea-treaty
[https://perma.cc/N6RQ-RUVA]
(describing the US failure to ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea); Joe
Lauria, Why Won't the US Ratify the UN's Children's Rights Convention?,
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business conduct. Or at least, that is the conventional wisdom.
This article challenges this view by arguing that treaties can affect businesses even when treaties fail at some stage from negotiations to ratification. These failed treaties continue to influence
business behavior through a range of “penumbral effects.” These
effects do not command a business to obey a treaty, but they nonetheless improve business compliance with treaty norms by altering
the environment in which businesses operate.9 This article identifies three types of penumbral effects: pre-emption, coordination, and
noise.
Pre-emptive penumbral effects encourage business actors to improve the quality of their voluntary regulation in a particular policy area, such as environmental contamination or labor practices.
These effects are apparent when a treaty is on the horizon. Industry actors opposed to treaty regulation in the policy area will upgrade the quality of their voluntary regulation in order to demonstrate the efficacy of private regulation.
This is an old idea applied to a new context. In the domestic
setting, policymakers are more than familiar with the likelihood of
industry good behavior under the shadow of new or enhanced
regulation.10 These “spillover effects” are documented in policy
areas as diverse as environmental disclosures11 to credit card interHUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (Nov. 25, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
joe-lauria/why-wont-the-us-ratify-th_b_6195594.html [https://perma.cc/8WRTUHBE] (noting that the United States is one of only three countries that has not
ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child).
9 See, e.g., Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, in THE NEW
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 147, 150–54 (Walter W. Powell &
Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991) (discussing factors that drive institutional change
within organizations).
10 See, e.g., John W. Maxwell et al., Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism, 43 J.L. & ECON. 583, 613 (2000) (concluding that corporations are more likely to engage in voluntary self-regulation as
political pressure and the threat of formal regulation increases).
11 Hyunhoe Bae, Voluntary Disclosure of Environmental Performance: Do Publicly and Privately Owned Organizations Face Different Incentives/Disincentives?, 44 AM.
REV. PUB. ADMIN. 459, 460 (2012); Eun-Hee Kim & Thomas P. Lyon, Strategic Environmental Disclosure: Evidence from the DOE’s Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Registry, 61
J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 311, 326 (2011); Erin M. Reid & Michael W. Toffel, Responding to Public and Private Politics: Corporate Disclosure of Climate Change Strategies, 30 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1157, 1164–67 (2009).
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est rates.12 Pre-emptive penumbral effects are the global equivalents of this domestic practice. These penumbral effects can reinforce under-enforced treaties or disseminate norms from treaties
that never emerged.
Coordination penumbral effects occur when businesses rally
around a treaty, or prospective treaty, to support or resist it. If
they support it, they use it as the basis for their own contracts or
industry standards, even when no state commands them to do so.13
If they resist it, they will coordinate their opposition against it, but
this opposition forces industry actors to recognize industry issues
and begin to identify solutions. Regardless of whether the treaty
wins industry favor or resistance, the common outcome is that the
treaty galvanizes industry actors into action in a manner they
would not were it not for the treaty (or prospective treaty).
Finally, treaties are noisy. We are accustomed to witnessing
triumphant presidents sign treaties before global audiences, precipitating media pundits to disseminate and scrutinize, praise, and
censure. These noise penumbral effects create pressure for businesses
to reform their current practices by raising awareness of policy issues and risking reputational shaming of recalcitrant business actors. Even treaties that never reach this stage may attract noise because of the attention that the resistance draws.
These penumbral effects are especially important in the current
political environment—both domestic and international—that poses risks to treaty-making and successful implementation.14 Penumbral effects partially compensate for treaty failures when we
are primarily concerned with the behavior of non-state actors. A
treaty that ultimately “fails” because of a breakdown in the treaty
12
Victor Stango, Strategic Responses to Regulatory Threat in the Credit Card
Market, 46 J.L. & ECON. 427, 430 (2003).
13 See Natasha Affolder, The Market for Treaties, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 159, 161
(2010) [hereinafter Affolder, The Market for Treaties] (explaining that treaty norms
from international environmental treaties are incorporated into private contracts).
See also Anne van Aaken, Effectuating Public International Law Through Market
Mechanisms?, 165 J. INST. THEORETICAL ECON. 33, 41 (2008) (explaining incentive
structures for encouraging market actors to comply with public international law);
Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
129, 133 (explaining how market mechanisms, as part of a private governance
scheme, offer “the standard-setting, implementation, monitoring, enforcement,
and adjudication roles traditionally played by public regulatory regimes”).
14 See infra notes 39–47 and accompanying text.
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process may still precipitate spillover effects within the shadow regions of the treaty where voluntary industry regulation occurs.
Critically, a treaty may not need to emerge for these penumbral
effects to occur. The treaty process itself involves important features that can affect the quality of industry self-regulation, including identification of deficiencies with current self-regulatory projects, articulation of policy recommendations, increased
coordination among stakeholders, and reputational shaming.
Viewing treaties in this manner preserves their important role in
the regulation of international affairs but adapts this role in light of
contemporary challenges.
This article illustrates treaty penumbral effects with a case
study of a potential treaty that also involves both high stakes and a
high risk of failure: an international treaty on transnational business and human rights. In 2014, the Human Rights Council established an open-ended intergovernmental working group
(OEIGWG) to elaborate an international legally binding instrument
on transnational corporations and other business enterprises regarding respect for human rights.15
Business and human rights provides a good case study for
studying penumbral effects for the following reasons. First, this
treaty may fail spectacularly, as some have already predicted. In
that case, it is important to examine the regulatory effects of the
treaty-making process itself, as opposed to the treaty outcome, to
understand better the effect of this process on the behavior of the
non-state actors the treaty is addressing. Second, many regulatory
methods were attempted over the past few decades to reform
transnational business conduct. Some of these methods relied on
hard law strategies whereas others favored non-binding approaches. This history provides important information regarding the efficacy of these various regulatory methods, including how the former interacted with and influenced the latter.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the traditional framework for evaluating the effectiveness of treaties that
privileges the effects of treaties on state actors as opposed to nonstate actors. This section explains why these criteria for effective15 U.N. Human Rights Council, Elaboration of an International Legally Binding
Instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect
to Human Rights, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1 (June 24, 2014).
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ness are no longer tenable in light of fractured international politics
and the rising role of multinational corporations. Section 3 describes the primary contribution of the article: an alternative theoretical framework for assessing the effectiveness of treaties that accounts for treaty effects on businesses. This section explains the
regulatory benefits of “penumbral” effects: preemption, coordination, and noise. Section 4 applies this theoretical framework to a
case study on business and human rights, concluding with an assessment of how this case study illustrates penumbral effects in
practice. Finally, Section 5 outlines strategies for operationalizing
penumbral effects and implications of this framework for policymakers.
2.

EVALUATING EFFECTIVENESS: THE STATIST VIEW OF TREATY
SUCCESS

A treaty is an international agreement between states whereby
they bind themselves legally to act in a particular way.16 For centuries, treaties regulated conduct on the international stage.17 The
scholarship on the effectiveness of international law is vast, and
this Section does not attempt to provide a comprehensive account.
Instead, it examines a common thread within this literature: its focus on state behavior.18
16 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(a), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 332, 333 (defining the role and purpose of treaties in international law);
MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 88 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing the consentbased nature of treaties).
17 See MARK WESTON JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
COMMENTARY 31–52 (5th ed., 2014) (providing excerpts from treaties over the centuries).
18 See, e.g., Joel Trachtman, International Law and Domestic Political Coalitions:
The Grand Theory of Compliance with International Law, 11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 127, 127
(2010) (“If international law is to be a useful tool of international cooperation, we
must know more about its social effects: its ability to cause states to take action
that they would not have taken, or to refrain from taking action that they would
have taken but for the existence of the international law rule.”). See also Ryan
Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 623 (2004) (explaining that an understanding of
“the social forces that shape the behavior of states” is necessary when grappling
with questions of international regime design); Andrew Guzman, A ComplianceBased Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1826 (2002) (noting that
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This focus not only influences the scholarship on treaties but
also the study of international law generally. This focus is understandable because many of the global problems that international
law addresses result from state behavior. The Section below discusses both the importance of studying state compliance as well as
the limitations of this focus.
2.1. Focusing on Core Effects: State Compliance
The state centric evaluation of treaty success focuses on the effects of a treaty on conduct by state actors.19 This makes sense given that treaties are ultimately international agreements between
states. Treaties are negotiated, drafted, signed, and ratified by
state actors with the intent of influencing state behavior going forward. Consequently, the evaluation of treaty success historically
focused on the effects of treaties on state behavior; this is referred
to as the “core” effects of treaties. This focus encourages international law scholars to evaluate state compliance with international
legal rules20 and offer explanations for compliance (or noncompliance).21 Some scholars explain compliance with reference to
most international law scholars believe that international law “matters,” that it
“affects the behavior of states,” and introducing a comprehensive theory to explain why states are influenced by international law); Harold Hongju Koh, Why
Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L. J. 2599, 2646 (1997) (suggesting
that the concept of transnational legal process—the process by which domestic
legal systems internalize international norms—is fundamental to understanding
why sovereign states obey international law).
19 Baradaran et. al, supra note 1, at 747.
20 See Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 83–85 (2007) (analyzing trends in investment treaty
arbitration using empirical data on the identity and number of parties involved
and on the resulting outcomes); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties
Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1968–76 (2002) (measuring state compliance
with international treaty rules on genocide, torture, fair and public trials, civil liberties, and political representation of women); Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of
Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 345, 347 (1997) (“[T]he dearth of good empirical studies of correspondence
between state behavior and international legal rules and decisions is a serious obstacle to adequate understanding and evaluation of the international legal system.”). But see Baradaran et. al, supra note 1, at 804–06 (measuring private actor
compliance with financial transparency laws).
21 Guzman, supra note 18 (“Indeed, the absence of an explanation for why
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rational actor theories. According to Andrew Guzman, states act
from rational self-interest and choose to comply (or not) based on
calculations of reputational costs and direct sanctions associated
with violating international law.22 Joel Trachtman similarly employs a rationalist model of compliance but disaggregates the state
unit to examine the effects of domestic political processes on a
state’s decision to comply or violate international law.23
In contrast, another group of scholars emphasizes the importance of international legal rules and their associated regimes in
encouraging compliance. The “managerial school” of Abram
Chayes and Antonia Chayes prioritizes cooperation rather than
sanctions.24 They focus on encouraging compliance through “justification, discourse, and persuasion.”25 Thomas Franck emphasizes
the characteristics of the rules we want obeyed, explaining that the
fairness of international legal rules encourages states to comply.26
Fairness of rules depends upon both procedural and substantive
fairness and particularly depends upon determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence, and adherence.27
states obey international law in some instances but not others threatens to undermine the very foundations of the discipline.”). For a literature review of dominant
theories of compliance with international law see Guzman, supra note 18, at 1823;
Hathaway, supra note 20, at 2002–20; Kingsbury, supra note 20, at 348.
22 See id. at 1860–61 (“The decision to honor or breach a promise made to another state imposes costs and benefits upon the promising country and its decision-makers. The model assumes that decision-makers behave in such a way as to
maximize the payoffs that result from their actions. Thus, where the benefits of
breach outweigh its costs, a country is expected to violate its agreements with
other states. International law succeeds when it alters a state's payoffs in such a
way as to achieve compliance with an agreement when, in the absence of such
law, states would behave differently.”) (internal citations omitted).
23 See Trachtman, supra note 18, at 131 (“Compliance with international law
can be analyzed by reference to the domestic political coalitions that exist in order
to induce entry into the international legal rules, as well as those that will be precipitated by the establishment of the international legal rule.”).
24 See generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995)
(discussing the managerial approach to compliance).
25 Guzman, supra note 18, at 1830–32; Hathaway, supra note 20, at 1955–57;
Koh, supra note 18, at 2636.
26 THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 7
(2002) (explaining that states tend to comply with international law when these
rules satisfy expectations of distributive justice and right process).
27 See id. at 30–46 (providing more detailed definitions of the four factors).
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A final group of scholars emphasizes the role of norm diffusion
and socialization on encouraging compliance. Harold Koh focuses
on the dissemination of international legal rules into domestic legal
regimes, arguing that the “process of interaction, interpretation,
and internalization of international norms into domestic legal systems is pivotal to understanding why nations ‘obey’ international
law.”28 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks highlight the relationship
between state compliance and acculturation—“the general process
by which actors adopt the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the
surrounding culture.”29
These research questions are undoubtedly important for both
international legal scholars and policymakers. Every legal field
must possess some level of self-awareness regarding its authority
over its own subjects, especially about whether the latter listen and
the reasons they do. This knowledge is also important for policymakers who set trade terms, honor territorial boundaries, discipline corporate activity, and even wage wars against this background of knowledge.
Unfortunately, this research reveals only a partial picture of
how international law works. It ignores the effects of international
law’s key instrument—treaties—on a significant class of global actors: corporations and other business enterprises.30 As explained
below, this neglect compromises the study and practice of international law in significant ways.

28 Koh, supra note 18, at 2603. See also id. at 2646 (“One or more transnational
actors provokes an interaction (or series of interactions) with another, which forces an interpretation or enunciation of the global norm applicable to the situation.
By so doing, the moving party seeks not simply to coerce the other party, but to
internalize the new interpretation of the international norm into the other party's
internal normative system. The aim is to ‘bind’ that other party to obey the interpretation as part of its internal value set.”).
29 Goodman & Jinks, supra note 18, at 626.
30
Baradaran et al., supra note 1, at 747 (“Whether international law is ultimately effective in accomplishing its goals may depend less on whether a state
complies and more on whether sub-state entities act consistently with the goals of
international law. This misplaced focus on nations as the primary actors in international law neglects key players in international law: individuals and firms.”).
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2.2. The Limitations of the Statist View
The problem with the state centric evaluation of treaties is that
it is insufficient to address two significant challenges in the 21st
century. First, we need to care about treaty effects beyond the state
because corporations create a range of transnational harms that also need regulation; therefore, we need to know about non-state actor compliance with treaties. Second, as discussed below, we witness warning signs suggesting that it is becoming more difficult to
get treaties across the finish line. That is why it is also important to
consider the regulatory effects of treaties at various stages—
negotiation and drafting, adoption, signature, and ratification—
upon corporations and other business actors because these effects
suggest strategies for achieving treaty success despite the limitations with the state-centric approach discussed below.
2.2.1. Need to Regulate Corporations
States are not the only actors in need of international regulation. Instead, our daily headlines tell us why it is important to
regulate at least one type of non-state actor: transnational businesses.
Shell and Chevron face accusations of dumping oil into local
waterways in Nigeria and Ecuador, respectively.31 Apple faces
similar allegations of pollution problems in its global supply chain,
including using Chinese factories that fail to comply with regulations, discharge toxic metals, ignore the health concerns of local
communities, and dispose of hazardous waste in problematic
ways.32 Shell also came under heavy scrutiny in Kiobel v. Royal
31 See Krauss, supra note 3 (describing claims by Ecuadorean farmers that
Chevron had polluted local sections of the Amazon River with millions of gallons
of toxic wastewater); Smith-Spark, supra note 3 (reporting that Nigerian farmers
and an environmental group brought suit against Shell for polluting local water
sources with oil over a period of several years).
32 See David Barboza, Apple Cited as Adding to Pollution in China, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 1, 2011), http://nyti.ms/1OdXYoc [https://perma.cc/9Q5M-PXKU] (describing a report released by an environmental policy institute in Beijing accusing
Apple suppliers of repeatedly failing to properly dispose of hazardous and toxic
waste); Xie Xiaoping, Apple Wakes up to Chinese Pollution Concerns, GUARDIAN (Oct.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss2/1

2017]

TREATY PENUMBRAS

289

Dutch Petroleum for its involvement in massive human rights violations in Nigeria.33 Even Disney is under fire. Labor activists accuse the cartoon giant of using children to make toys for other
children, as well as contracting with factories that push workers to
perform three times the overtime permitted by law.34
We witness these practices because of the “governance gaps
created by globalization - between the scope and impact of economic forces and actors, and the capacity of societies to manage
their adverse consequences.”35 National regulators are stretched to
their limit to control business behavior because businesses can relocate to a place where the regulators’ laws do not apply and
where local laws are absent or unenforced.36 The countries in
which corporations operate are constrained in their ability to regulate the conduct of transnational corporations operating within
their borders.37 Limited institutional capacity may constrain their
ability to enforce their laws; however, sometimes host states purposefully avoid laws proscribing certain forms of corporate con4,
2011),
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/oct/04/applechinese-pollution-concerns [https://perma.cc/ASF4-MPTX] (describing pollution
problems in Apple’s supply chain).
33 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013) (listing the violations of the law of nations alleged by the Nigerian plaintiffs); Nina Totenberg, Human Rights Victims Seek Remedy At High Court, NPR (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.npr.org/
2012/02/28/147507940/human-rights-victims-seek-remedy-at-high-court
[https://perma.cc/JWU2-HCTL] (describing the plaintiffs’ claims that Shell
“worked hand-in-glove with the Nigerian military to brutally suppress any opposition to the way the company operates”).
34 Gethin Chamberlain, Disney Factory Faces Probe into Sweatshop Suicide
Claims, GUARDIAN (Aug. 27, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2011/
aug/27/disney-factory-sweatshop-suicide-claims [https://perma.cc/D38F-4BS5]
(reporting that Disney’s toys from the movie “Cars” were made with child labor).
35 John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises), Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, ¶ 3,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) [hereinafter Framework].
36 See Tricia D. Olsen, Access to Remedy: Accountability for Allegations of
Corporate Human Rights Abuse in Latin America 5–6 (September 16, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (explaining that a significant number
of allegations of corporate misconduct are not met with any remedies).
37 Beth Stephens, Making Remedies Work: Envisioning a Treaty-Based System of
Effective Remedies, in BUILDING A TREATY ON BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS (Surya Deva
& David Bilchitz eds., forthcoming) (manuscript at 5–6, 15–17) (discussing various
limitations with obtaining remedies against transnational corporations in host
states).
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duct in an effort to attract investment.38
2.2.2. Risks to Future Regulation by Treaties
The second limitation with the statist view is that, although we
need to regulate transnational businesses, treaties may not be up to
this task.39
Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses Wessel, and Jans Wouters identify the
reduced number of multilateral treaties deposited with the United
Nations Secretary General in recent decades.40 They interpret these
declining figures as signs of “stagnation” in multilateral treaty
making in the 21st century.41 The problems do not end with treaty
creation. Even if state officials can agree on a treaty, they often
need the support of domestic legislatures, but this support is not
always forthcoming.42 For example, senators have communicated
38 See John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises), Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ¶¶ 29–30, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006) (noting the lack of government regulations related to social and human rights issues, which sometimes requires companies to take
on quasi-governmental functions to fill the void); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan
Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 503 (2009)
(analyzing the ways in which nongovernmental actors can innovate international
regulation); Framework, supra note 35, ¶ 14 (describing how some states lack regulatory enforcement capabilities or may choose not to utilize it to attract international business and investment).
39 See, e.g., Doug Cassel & Anita Ramasastry, Anatomy of a Business and Human
Rights Treaty?, INST. HUM. RTS. & BUS.: COMMENTARY (June 25, 2015),
http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/anatomy-business-and-human-rightstreaty.html [https://perma.cc/WA33-N37K] (“Current international law imposes
certain human rights obligations on business, but the coverage is incomplete, indirect and largely ineffective.”).
40 Pauwelyn et al., supra note 7, at 734. See also KENNETH W. ABBOTT ET AL.,
HARV. PROJECT CLIMATE AGREEMENT DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 13-57, ORGANIZATIONAL
ECOLOGY IN WORLD POLITICS: INSTITUTIONAL DENSITY AND ORGANIZATIONAL
STRATEGIES 2 (2013), http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/dp57_abbottgreen-keohane.pdf [https://perma.cc/X5AM-RMUH] (noting the decline in both
formal international law-making and formation of intergovernmental organizations). Some argue, however, that the treaty projects of the present era address
more niche and controversial topics, thereby compromising cooperation.
41 Pauwelyn et al., supra note 7, at 734.
42 Associated Press, supra note 8.
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opposition to ratifying the U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea,43 the Trans-Pacific Partnership,44 and the Paris Climate
Agreement.45
Do these signs signal the end of treaty making in the 21st century? Perhaps not. But they do signal that treaties may have an
uncertain future and there is a need for adaptation, be it great or
small. The extent of the treaty uncertainty affects the degree of adaptation. The Section below explains how international lawyers
and scholars can adapt treaties under different conditions of uncertainty to exert regulatory effects on businesses. As discussed below, a “treaty as process” approach can produce valuable sideeffects that are often neglected when we focus only on the regulatory effects of treaties as products. The treaty process can itself
43 See Julian Pecquet, Opposition to Law of the Sea Treaty Heats Up, HILL (May
25, 2012), http://thehill.com/policy/international/229637-opposition-to-law-ofthe-sea-treaty-heats-up [https://perma.cc/5YE2-RSCX] (reporting that twentyseven U.S. Senators had signed a letter expressing opposition to the ratification of
the convention).
44 Sen. Elizabeth Warren, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone Should
Oppose, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2015), http://wpo.st/fN081 [https://perma.cc/
D92N-KBBY] (arguing that the TPP’s arbitration clause would undermine U.S.
sovereignty).
45 Timothy Cama, GOP Chairman Blasts Paris Climate Accord, HILL (Dec. 12,
2015),
http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/263049-gop-chairmanblasts-paris-climate-accord [https://perma.cc/WV3N-S4PC] (“[Senator] Inhofe,
an outspoken doubter of the human role in climate change, has worked in recent
months to undermine the agreement and demand that it be submitted to the Senate for approval, which it would not get.”).
Over the past few decades, regulatory networks have emerged as popular fora for
international policy-making. Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law
Works (and How It Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J. 257, 290–91 (2011); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of
International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 12 (2002); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 YALE J. INT’L. 113, 118 (2009); AnneMarie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L
L. 283, 290 (2004); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1041, 1053
(2003); David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281, 284–85 (1998).
In these networks, government actors come together to share information, harmonize rules, and improve enforcement activities in a range of issue areas, including
securities regulation, banking supervision, insurance, and the environment.
Raustiala, supra, at 12; Zaring, supra, at 282. For example, many issues in crossborder financial regulation are addressed within networks through informal processes. Jean Galbraith & David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 735, 737–39, 745–48 (2014).
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create side-effects with significant implications for the success of
other regulatory strategies that also aim to constrain transnational
business behavior. The treaty process, therefore, can bolster the efficacy of these other institutions.
3.

FROM CORE TO PENUMBRA: TREATY EFFECTS BEYOND THE
STATE

The problem with the state-centric evaluation of treaty success
is that it neglects that treaties can have indirect effects on business
actors without the active involvement of state actors. This belief
understandably fuels a pessimistic view of treaties because of the
difficulties with obtaining state cooperation in the treaty process.
Fortunately, treaties have significant effects on actors beyond
the state by offering a complex range of incentives to a diverse
range of business actors. This analysis reveals three important insights about treaties that relate to audience, effects, and measuring
success.
Treaties have at least two sets of distinct audiences and, therefore, exert at least two different types of effects. The most familiar
audience is states; traditional legal scholarship focuses on a treaty’s
effects on compliance by state actors (“core effects”), as discussed
in Section 2.1., supra.
However, treaties also exert important effects on actors beyond
the state. Treaty norms intended for adoption and enforcement by
states can influence private ordering between business actors.46 A
number of businesses incorporate treaty norms into private contracts between themselves and their suppliers or in codes of conduct within particular industries.47 Multi-stakeholder groups also
develop their own techniques for disseminating international law
norms within their own communities.48
46 See Affolder, The Market for Treaties, supra note 13 (explaining that treaty
norms from international environmental treaties are incorporated into private
contracts). See also Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 129, 133 (; Aaken, supra note 13.
47 See, e.g., Affolder, The Market for Treaties, supra note 13, at 161, 168–89 (detailing corporate engagement with international treaties).
48 See infra, note 62 and accompanying text.
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These are some of the many ways that treaties have a private,
non-state audience. For the purpose of this article, these are “penumbral effects” of treaties and are distinguishable from a treaty’s
“core effects” on states. There are three primary forms of penumbral effects on transnational businesses: pre-emption, coordination,
and noise. Pre-emptive effects can precipitate industry regulation by
businesses in an attempt to demonstrate the efficacy of voluntary
regulation and discourage future treaty regulation. Coordination
effects occur because treaties, in their various stages of development, offer strong incentives for private coordination in regulation.
Finally, noise effects result from the attention received by a treaty
making process that creates and sustains pressure for reform.
These effects are important because they offer strategies for
achieving treaty success despite the limitations with the statecentric approach discussed in Section 2.2., supra. First, penumbral
effects concern the regulatory effects of treaties on businesses. As
such, they identify ways to regulate transnational business conduct
using the traditional international law mechanism of a treaty.
Second, penumbral effects offer different strategies for addressing “treaty uncertainty”: the likelihood of state cooperation in the
negotiation, drafting, adoption, signing, and ratification of future
treaties. The type of penumbral effects we can expect depends on
the nature and severity of the treaty uncertainty. If this treaty uncertainty is weak so that the overall number of treaties created remain the same or decrease without disappearing altogether, then
we can expect all three types of effects, including pre-emptive penumbral effects.
If the treaty uncertainty is strong, then state cooperation is unlikely regarding any future treaty and industry actors will realize
this. In this situation, preemptive penumbral effects are unlikely,
but the process of treaty negotiations and drafting still create two
important penumbral effects, noise and coordination, that create
beneficial spillover effects. These different penumbral effects are
summarized in Table 1 and described below.
Table 1: Types of Penumbral Effects
Treaty Uncertainty
Penumbral Effect
Weak
Pre-emptive Effects
Noise Effects
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Coordination Effects
Noise Effects
Coordination Effects

Treaty uncertainty does not exist as a binary; this uncertainty
can occur along the range between strong and weak. We may also
witness a blending of penumbral effects. Although pre-emptive
penumbral effects may dissipate if the treaty uncertainty is strong,
noise and coordination effects can accompany both strong and
weak treaty uncertainty; however, these effects are more important
when the treaty uncertainty is strong because they represent the
most robust penumbral effects and best hope for stimulating industry regulation.
Finally, penumbral effects are important because they partially
compensate for the absence of a treaty when the absent treaty targets business behavior. Treaty enthusiasts may wish to answer all
forms of transnational business misconduct with a treaty.49 However, such a possibility is unlikely even if the treaty uncertainty is
weak. Penumbral effects partially compensate for this absence by
fostering renewed voluntary regulation.
The penumbral effects are even more important when the treaty uncertainty is strong and the prospect of a treaty remote. In
these situations, the most viable form of regulation may be voluntary regulation. Penumbral effects demonstrate how treatymaking processes can facilitate such regulation.
3.1. Weak Treaty Uncertainty: Pre-Emption Penumbral Effects
If the number of treaties that states produce stays the same
or declines without disappearing, then the treaty-making process
49 Joost Pauwelyn & Liliana Andonova, A "Legally Binding Treaty" or Not? The
Wrong Question for Paris Climate Summit, LINKEDIN (Dec. 3, 2015),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/legally-binding-treaty-wrong-question-parisclimate-summit-pauwelyn?trk=mp-reader-card
(https://perma.cc/35SE-B3EV)
(“[T]he idea of a ‘binding treaty’ continues to be portrayed as the Holy Grail, a
silver bullet that will solve all problems. This is wrongheaded. Making something
a ‘binding treaty’ at the international level does not, as such, add much. Yet, it
takes longer to negotiate and ratify, may reduce the level of ambition, sets the issue in stone and limits the parties involved to states.”).
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can produce important spillover effects that partially compensate
for treaties that fail to emerge. Even a decline in treaties is not the
same thing as the extinction of treaties. A decline is important because it suggests that treaty regulation may not be available to address important international issues in the future. However, so
long as states remain capable of creating treaties, albeit at a lower
rate, the treaty-making process can incentivize another form of
regulation: voluntary industry regulation.
In the domestic setting, scholars in law and economics and
management studies observed improvements in self-regulation in
the period following the announcement of potential impending
public regulation.50 Pre-emptive penumbral effects are the global
equivalents of these domestic phenomena. These penumbral effects can reinforce under enforced treaties or disseminate norms
from treaties that never emerged. Similar to the domestic situation, the regulatory threat of a treaty—manifested by the onset of a
treaty drafting and negotiation process—may incentivize improved voluntary regulation as industry actors ramp up efforts at
voluntary regulation in anticipation of a treaty that is heading
down the road.
These pre-emptive penumbral effects are different from the
way we usually envision and expect treaties to operate. Here, treaties provide the incentive to self-regulate; they are not the sources
of substantive rules and do not provide mechanisms for enforcement. Instead, these functions are performed by private standardsetting and a widening range of regulatory strategies.51 These preemptive effects make two important regulatory contributions.
First, they may occur even if a final treaty never enters into force.
Second, these effects could partially compensate for the absence of
50 See Maxwell et al., supra note 10, at 613 (“When it is costly for consumers to
organize and to influence the political process, firms can match the net utility consumers expect from regulatory controls with a lower level of voluntary controls
and can thereby deter consumer groups from mobilizing to enter the political process. As the threat of regulation grows, for example, because of reductions in consumers’
informational and organizational costs, self-regulation becomes more stringent.”) (emphasis added); Stango, supra note 12, at 434 (“Within 1 day after the threat, two of
the largest issuers in the country (AT&T and First Chicago) immediately announced interest rate cuts . . . . These initial responses were followed by an industry-wide period of rate cutting.”).
51 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 38, at 514–18 (describing various forms of
regulatory standard-setting schemes involving a variety of stakeholders).
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a final treaty because these effects stimulate another kind of regulation: voluntary regulation.
Will penumbral pre-emptive effects always accompany a prospective treaty? No. Preemptive effects rely on certain treaty conditions, as explained in the following hypotheticals.
In Hypothetical 1, assume that state parties adopt Treaty A on
child labor but fail to adopt a subsequent Treaty B on child labor.
The treaty-making process for Treaty B can incentivize voluntary
self-regulation related to child labor that partially compensates for
the failure of Treaty B to result. For treaty enthusiasts, the bestcase scenario is if states sign and ratify Treaty B. If Treaty B is not
adopted and ratified, the second best outcome is for the preemptive effects associated with the treaty process for Treaty B to
stimulate improved behavior by industry actors.
The fact that state parties adopted and ratified Treaty A results
in stronger signals to industry during the treaty negotiation for
Treaty B, increasing the likelihood of improvements in voluntary
regulation.
In Hypothetical 2, assume that there is no Treaty A on child labor but that states had created Treaty C on arms trading. Preemptive effects can still occur in a policy area previously unregulated
by treaties so long as other treaties emerge. Treaty C could still incentivize voluntary regulation during the treaty negotiation process for Treaty B because Treaty C demonstrates to industry actors
that states are still willing and capable of producing treaties. Absent other factors, industry actors may not be able to predict that
an overall decline in treaty making will result in reduced treaty
making in the particular policy area affecting them, i.e. child labor.
The problem arises when there is no Treaty C (or Treaty D, E,
etc). Hypothetical 3 lacks both Treaty A (on child labor), Treaty C
(on arms trading), or any other recent treaty. If signs not only indicate the decline of treaties but also the end of treaties per se, then
the signals to industry during the treaty-negotiation process are
likely insufficient to incentivize pre-emptive industry regulation.52
When that credibility is gone, so is the likelihood of pre-emptive
IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
DEREGULATION DEBATE 39 (1992) (explaining that it is “the existence and signaling of the capacity to get as tough as needed [that] can usher in a regulatory
climate that is more voluntaristic and nonlitigious” with most of the regulatory
action occurring in the realms of self-regulation.).
52

THE
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self-regulation. However, as discussed below, the treaty-making
process can still generate important spillover effects based on the
noise generated and the incentives for coordination.
Finally, even if penumbral pre-emptive effects do occur, one
may reasonably wonder what is to prevent a business from rolling
back its voluntary practices if the treaty-making process breaks
down and the treaty threat abates. In this situation, industry may
refrain from adopting additional initiatives or commitments, but it
is unlikely that they will roll back their current practices. First,
businesses broadcast their good practices in sustainability reports
that they post to their corporate website or file with the UN Global
Compact (if they are members).53 These sites usually contain several years’ worth of reports.54 NGOs and consumers who consult
these websites will therefore notice any backsliding.
Second, company policies may similarly prove difficult to roll
back after institutional changes have occurred, such as improved
training, enhanced feedback, integrated human rights decisionmaking, and improved due diligence. Finally, industry initiatives
are even more difficult to ignore. A number of these initiatives involve other stakeholders who will notice, and likely publicize, industry abandonment of initiatives.55
53 See generally ROYAL DUTCH SHELL, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2014 (2014),
http://reports.shell.com/sustainabilityreport/2014/servicepages/downloads/files/entire_shell_sr14.pdf?cat=b
[https://perma.cc/V5TJ-3MKK] (describing the self-disclosure by Royal Dutch
Shell as to its practices in 2014); Communication on Progress 2014, UNITED NATIONS
GLOBAL
COMPACT
(Apr.
34,
2015),
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/participation/report/cop/create-andsubmit/advanced/142431 [https://perma.cc/4FCD-AVPG] (providing further
background for Shell’s disclosures).
54 Shell’s website allows the viewer to compare Shell’s 2014 Report with its
previous report from 2013.
Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples, SHELL,
http://reports.shell.com/sustainability-report/2014/our-approach/living-byour-principles/human-rights-and-indigenous-peoples.html [https://perma.cc/
54VQ-TWR7] (last visited Nov. 9, 2016). See also Royal Dutch Shell plc, UNITED
NATIONS
GLOBAL
COMPACT,
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-isgc/participants/8082-Royal-Dutch-Shell-plc#cop
[https://perma.cc/F7SAC3YM] (last visited Nov. 9, 2016) (providing links to Shell’s communications on
progress from 2004–2014).
55 See,
e.g., Accountability, ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE, http://
www.ethicaltrade.org/about-eti/accountability [https://perma.cc/UCB2-PJFV]
(last visited Oct. 31, 2016) (keeping companies accountable for following industry
standards and initiatives).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017

298

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 38:2

In summary, treaty threats incentivize changes to business
practices, but there are a variety of other forces (market forces, media coverage, consumer pressure, NGO lobbying) that keep these
changes in place.
3.2. Strong Treaty Paralysis: Coordination and Noise Penumbral
Effects
If treaty uncertainty is strong, then it undermines the ability of
states both to create new treaties and to threaten to create new treaties. However, even if the prospect of a treaty is remote, the treatymaking process can create other penumbral effects even if it cannot
stimulate industry pre-emptive self-regulation. Specifically, a treaty process can create pressure for industry reform through the
noise created by the treaty-making process. Second, prospective
treaties can also serve as private coordination devices.
3.2.1. Coordination Effects
Coordination refers to the ability of many diverse actors to
work together to achieve a common goal.56 Coordination takes
many forms and pre-emption is only one example of coordinated
behavior. Even if a treaty does not encourage pre-emption by affected business actors, it can still encourage other forms of ex ante,
and even ex post, coordination. The type of coordination depends
on the nature of the treaty uncertainty. These effects are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Types of Private Coordination
Type of Treaty
Type of Treaty
Uncertainty

Nature of Private
Coordination

56 F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327,
345 (2006).
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Enforcement

Treaty in Force

Private
Enforcement

Ratification

Treaty in
Waiting

Private
Compliance

Adoption

Prospective Treaties

Private
Alternatives

If the uncertainty affects state enforcement of treaties but not
their adoption or ratification, then we already have treaties in force
and these treaties lower the costs of coordination in a particular
policy area by providing a template for private parties to use in
private ordering and therefore increasing the likelihood of private
enforcement. Coordination effects through private standardsetting and private enforcement can partially compensate for the
ineffective enforcement of treaties already in force.57
For example, the eight core conventions of the International
Labour Organization (ILO) are reflected in many of the world’s
dominant industry codes of conduct. This adoption is important
because it extends the ILO’s normative standards to a subset of
corporate actors despite national regulation that, on many occasions, is lacking.58 Second, many of these trade associations also
provide for the enforcement of these ILO normative standards
through grievance mechanisms or auditing and certification.59
57 See Affolder, The Market for Treaties, supra note 13 (explaining that corporations use treaties as sources of private environmental standards).
58 See Laurence Helfer, Understanding Change in International Organizations:
Globalization and Innovation in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. 649, 653 (2006) (discussing
the increasing discrepancy between treaty adoption and treaty ratification and declining ratification rates of ILO conventions).
59 For example, the Ethical Trading Initiative is a “leading alliance of companies, trade unions and NGOs that promotes respect for workers’ rights around the
globe.” About ETI, ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE, http://www.ethicaltrade.org/
about-eti [https://perma.cc/UCB2-PJFV] (last visited Oct. 31, 2016). Its members
include popular retailers like the Body Shop, Gap, and Tesco. Our Members,
ETHICAL TRADING INITIATIVE, http://www.ethicaltrade.org/about-eti/ourmembers [https://perma.cc/G2VN-KF2L] (last visited Oct. 31, 2016). The ETI
Base Code is based upon the ILO conventions and includes the following tenets:
(1) Employment is freely chosen; (2) Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining are respected; (3) Working conditions are safe and hygienic; (4)
Child labour shall not be used; (5) Living wages are paid; (6) Working hours are
not excessive; (7) No discrimination in practices; (8) Regular employment is pro-

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017

300

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 38:2

If the uncertainty affects the entry into force of treaties, then
“treaties-in-waiting” can encourage private coordination, even
compliance, depending on the incentives that the treaty offers to
business actors.60 The distributional outcomes associated with the
vided; and (9) No harsh or inhumane treatment is allowed. ETI Base Code,
ETHICAL
TRADING
INITIATIVE,
http://www.ethicaltrade.org/eti-base-code
[https://perma.cc/JS9D-5BVX] (last visited Nov. 9, 2016). The ILO core conventions are also reflected in industry codes of conduct, such as the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition Code of Conduct and the Forest Stewardship Council
certification standards.
Code of Conduct, ELEC. INDUS. CITIZENSHIP COAL.,
http://www.eiccoalition.org/standards/code-of-conduct/
[https://perma.cc/
9JDF-9G56] (last visited Oct. 31, 2016); Principles and Criteria for Forest Stewardship
(Version 4), FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://ic.fsc.org/principles-andcriteria.34.htm [https://perma.cc/XQP9-QMP2] (last visited Oct. 31, 2016). All
member companies of the ETI are expected to abide by the terms of the Base Code
and ensure that their suppliers comply. About ETI, supra. The ETI also includes a
member-wide grievance mechanism to enforce the provisions of the Base Code.
Under this grievance mechanism, any ETI member can raise complaints against a
corporate member or its supplier. CAROLINE REES & DAVID VERMIJS, MAPPING
GRIEVANCE MECHANISMS IN THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ARENA, CORP. SOC.
RESPONSIBILITY INITIATIVE REPORT NO. 28, 42 (2008). The ETI Base Code is not only
enforced at the level of the industry association. Instead, the different members of
the ETI also enforce the Base Code at the company level. For example, the retail
supermarket Tesco expects all its suppliers to abide by the standards of the ETI
Base Code. TESCO, OUR ETHICAL TRADING APPROACH: SUPPORTING DECENT LABOUR
STANDARDS
IN
TESCO’S
SUPPLY
CHAIN
2
(2014),
http://www.tescoplc.com/assets/files/cms/Resources/Trading_Responsibly/
Our_Ethical_Trading_approach.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5LQ-YFZW]. It developed a grievance mechanism for farm level disputes in the Western Cape Region
of South Africa in order to enforce the standards of the ETI Base Code among its
fruit suppliers. Hendrik Kotze, Farmworker Grievances in the Western Cape, South
Africa, 3 ACCESS CASE STORY SERIES 3 (2014), http://accessfacility.org/sites/
default/files/Farmworker%20Grievances%20Western%20Cape%20South%20
Africa.pdf [https://perma.cc/QE7L-LXRE] (describing how Tesco undertook this
project in cooperation with the Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative (CSRI) of
Harvard University’s Kennedy School and how both Tesco and CSRI did this project on behalf of the UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights,
John Ruggie).
60 For example, The Minamata Convention on Mercury (“Minamata Convention”) is a global treaty to protect human health and the environment from the
adverse effects of mercury. Minamata Convention on Mercury, art. 1, Jan. 19,
2013, U.N. ENV’T. PROGRAMME, http://www.mercuryconvention.org/
Portals/11/documents/Booklets/Minamata Convention on Mercury_booklet_
English.pdf [https://perma.cc/EBQ5-LTGB] [hereinafter Minamata Convention].
As of writing, it has 128 signatures and thirty-five ratifications but needs fifty ratifications before it enters into force. Minamata Convention, supra, art. 1; Convention, MINAMATA CONVENTION ON MERCURY, http://www.mercuryconvention.org/
Convention/tabid/3426/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/L7GJ-LMRZ] (last visited Nov. 27, 2016). Despite the fact that it is a treaty-in-waiting, the Minamata

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss2/1

2017]

TREATY PENUMBRAS

301

treaty text can incentivize industry cooperation even if the treaty is
not yet in force.
Finally, if treaty uncertainty affects the possibility of negotiating, drafting, and adopting treaties, the associated penumbral effects may still influence industry behavior. Specifically, prospective treaties may serve as penalty defaults in both form and
substance of regulation. Penalty defaults are legal rules that are so
undesirable that parties contract around these provisions in order
to avoid their effects.61 These defaults are non-majoritarian because the parties will often choose not to adopt these rules.62 However, penalty defaults exert information-forcing effects by encouraging parties to negotiate terms that they might not otherwise
address.
A prospective treaty provides a template of the form of regulation that will result if voluntary regulation fails. As a result, we
may expect increased industry engagement in voluntary initiatives
Convention is already driving private action in favor of compliance, at least
among the world’s dentists. Dentists care about the Minamata Convention because one of their primary tools, dental amalgam, is a mercury-added product.
Dental amalgam contains approximately 50% mercury and forms an intermetallic
alloy with copper, silver, and tin. FDI WORLD DENTAL FEDERATION, POLICY
STATEMENT: DENTAL AMALGAM AND MINAMATA CONVENTION ON MERCURY 1 (2014),
http://www.fdiworldental.org/media/55201/6-fdi_ps-dental_amalgam_and_
minamata_adopted_gab_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/QUC2-QK9T]. During negotiations on the Minamata Convention, the World Dental Federation (FDI) advocated for a reduction (phase-down) in the use of dental amalgam—versus a ban
(phase-out), and they were successful in obtaining a phase-down. FDI WORLD
DENTAL FEDERATION, DENTAL RESTORATIVE MATERIALS AND THE MINAMATA
CONVENTION ON MERCURY: GUIDELINES FOR SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION 3 (2014),
http://www.fdiworldental.org/media/54670/minamata-convention_fdiguidelines-for-successful-implementation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6AEF-RN39].
This concession to the global dental association prompted the organization to urge
its members (including national dental associations) to comply with the terms of
the Minamata Convention even before the Convention is in effect. The FDI issued
a recent set of industry guidelines that encourage its member dental associations
to comply in order to prevent a reconsideration of the concession granted to the
dental industry under the Convention. Id. at 6.
61 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (“Penalty defaults are designed
to give at least one party to the contract an incentive to contract around the default rule and therefore to choose affirmatively the contract provision they prefer .
. . . [P]enalty defaults are purposefully set at what the parties would not want – in
order to encourage the parties to reveal information to each other or to third parties (especially the courts).”).
62 Id.
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in order to demonstrate the efficacy of an alternative to treaty regulation.63 This is a variant of pre-emptive penumbral effects and is
dependent upon weak treaty uncertainty.
If the treaty uncertainty is strong, a prospective treaty serves as
a penalty default regarding substance because the treaty’s draft
text may contain terms that industry does not like and may reject.
However, the draft text already placed certain categories of terms
on the table. This influences the mandate of topics and issues addressed by voluntary regulation.
3.2.2. Noise Effects
When the treaties at issue concern conduct by transnational
business actors, the noise surrounding the treaty process creates
important regulatory effects. Specifically, the noise alerts the public and policymakers to weaknesses with current industry practices, raises awareness of policy issues, creates pressure for reform of
current business practices, and threatens reputational shaming for
businesses with poor practice records. Corporations may not willingly alter their practices without the pressure created by this
noise.64 This interaction between external pressure and internal
firm culture emphasizes the importance of a treaty process in
achieving results.
These effects are not limited to treaty-making processes. Media
campaigns and publicized lawsuits can also create similar pressure. But the pressure generated by a treaty-making process is distinguishable in two important ways. First, prospective treaties
have a global audience, thereby raising awareness of policy issues
in a manner difficult to achieve through these other methods. A
Virginian resident may be unaware of environmental litigation in
Germany, but they are likely aware of the climate change summit
held in Paris in December 2015.
Second, prospective treaties may serve as harbingers of future
63 Reid & Toffel, supra note 11, at 1162 (“Organizations often respond to
threats of tighter government regulation by adopting forms of self-regulation in
an attempt to credibly signal to the government that the desired behavior is occurring even without additional regulation.”).
64 Telephone Interview with International Policy Advisor (Sept. 3, 2015).
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domestic legislation. State parties to a treaty routinely undertake
obligations to enforce the treaty’s substantive rules within their national jurisdiction.65 Therefore, a treaty may signal future changes
to the domestic legal regime of a state joining a treaty. Admittedly,
this signal depends on the nature of the ratification process. Businesses situated in states with simplified ratification processes are
likely more sensitive to treaty threats compared to their peers in jurisdictions with more onerous ratification processes. This signal
also depends on the extent of deadlock within domestic legislatures and the prospect for successful ratification of treaties.66
4.

PENUMBRAL EFFECTS IN ACTION: A REGULATORY HISTORY OF
BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS

This Section applies the theoretical framework described in
Section II to the regulation of international business and human
rights and evaluates whether this history provides evidence of penumbral effects in practice.
The policy area of business and human rights was chosen for
a number of reasons. First, it is an area rich in regulatory pluralism
where a variety of methods are employed to reform transnational
business conduct.67 Second, there are several decades’ worth of
regulation in this area. This Section only focuses on approximately
Durkee, supra note 2, at 109.
Coral Davenport, Nations Approve Landmark Climate Accord, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 12 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/world/europe/climatechange-accord-paris.html [https://perma.cc/2VZP-KW5D]. The effects on industry actors may also vary depending on their expectation that a state can effectively
enforce the treaty’s provisions within domestic law. See Durkee, supra note 2, at
91–92 (distinguishing between resolution and persuasion treaties).
67
See, e.g., California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §
1714.43(a)(1) (West 2012) (requiring that covered firms disclose “its efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking from its direct supply chain for tangible
goods offered for sale”); HEWLET-PACKARD AGREEMENT, SUPPLIER SOCIAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY AGREEMENT (2008), http://www.hp.com/
hpinfo/globalcitizenship/environment/pdf/supagree.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
F9DZ-AGZ5] (describing the company code of conduct); Participation, U.N.
GLOBAL COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/participation [https://
perma.cc/ELW2-6ULC] (last visited Nov. 9, 2016) (describing UN guidelines);
Framework, supra note 35, ¶ 4 (outlining the various methods that John Ruggie has
employed).
65
66
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the past fifteen years, but the history traces back to at least the
1970s and the draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations.68 This history provides an opportunity to evaluate how
these various regulatory methods fared. Third, globalization exacerbates the negative impact of transnational business conduct.69
Finally, we are at a potentially historic moment in the regulation of business and human rights. In 2014, a close vote of the
Human Rights Council established an open-ended intergovernmental working group (OEIGWG) to elaborate on an international
legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other
business enterprises regarding respect for human rights.70 The
prospects for success are mixed, with some already dooming the
venture to failure.71 It is more than possible that this prospective
international instrument may fail to arrive. That is why it is important to consider this prospective instrument in its full context
and examine whether it can still create beneficial regulatory effects
even if it “fails.”
4.1. Phase 1: The United Nations Global Compact
In January 1999, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan
68 David Kinely et al., The Politics of Corporate Social Responsibility: Reflections
on the United Nations Human Rights Norms for Corporations, 30 CO. & SECS. L.J. 30, 32
n.7 (2007).
69 Chamberlain, supra note 34 (reporting on the use of child labor by factories
that make Disney toys); Krauss, supra note 3 (iterating Chevron/Texaco’s oil contamination of Ecuadorian rainforest); Smith-Spark, supra note 3 (describing
Shell’s’ oil contamination in the Niger Delta); Totenberg, supra note 33 (describing
Shell’s involvement in human rights abuses in Nigeria); Xiaoping, supra note 32
(explaining the poor environmental practices of Apple’s suppliers in China).
70 Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, Elaboration of an International Legally
Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
Respect to Human Rights, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/26/L.22/Rev.1 (June 25, 2014).
71 See, e.g., John Ruggie, Get Real or We'll Get Nothing: Reflections on the First
Session of the Intergovernmental Working Group on a Business and Human Rights Treaty, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RES. CTR., http://business-humanrights.org/en/get-real-orwell-get-nothing-reflections-on-the-first-session-of-the-intergovernmentalworking-group-on-a-business-and-human-rights-treaty [https://perma.cc/23J5H7L3] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016) (“If present dynamics continue, the process is
likely to yield one of two outcomes: no treaty at all, or one that squeaks through to
adoption but is ratified by few if any major home countries and thus would be of
no help to the victims in whose name the negotiations were launched.”).
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proposed the United Nations Global Compact (the “Compact”) in
order to improve global corporate conduct in the wake of globalization at the end of the millennium.72 The Compact promotes a set
of values based on internationally recognized documents, such as
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.73
The Compact is a voluntary initiative.74 As a consequence,
businesses are encouraged but not required to join the Compact. If
a corporation does become a member, it is required to abide by the
Compact’s ten foundational principles that relate to human rights,
labor, the environment, and anti-corruption.75 It is also required to
report annually on its progress towards these commitments by
submitting a Communication on Progress (COP).76
The Compact began well with support from at least fifty companies in diverse industries, including mining, banking, pharmaceuticals, footwear, and media.77 But not all industry players were
pleased with the Compact, and the International Chamber of
Commerce initially opposed it.78
The Compact also failed to please some actors in the NGO
community. Following the announcement of the Compact, Human
Rights Watch (HRW) wrote to the Compact’s founder, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, sharing its concerns that the effectiveness
72
Press Release, Secretary-General, Executive Summary and Conclusion of
the High-Level Meeting on the Global Compact, U.N. Press Release SG/2065 (July
27, 2000) [hereinafter Press Release, UN Global Compact].
73 Id.
74
George Kell, Ann-Marie Slaughter & Thomas Hale, Silent Reform Through
the Global Compact, 1 UN CHRONICLE 26, 27 (2007).
75 The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL
COMPACT,
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles
[https://perma.cc/D7YH-FM23] (last visited Oct. 24, 2016) (“Corporate sustainability starts with a company’s value system and a principled approach to doing
business. This means operating in ways that, at a minimum, meets fundamental
responsibilities in the areas of human rights, labour, environment and anticorruption.”).
76 Id.
77 See Press Release, UN Global Compact, supra note 72 (noting the number of
transnational companies that had pledged to adopt the compact).
78 David Weissbrodt, Keynote Address, before University of California,
Berkeley: International Standard-Setting on the Human Rights Responsibilities of
Businesses (Mar. 14, 2008) in 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 373, 384 (2008) (“These international business organizations—reflecting the most hard-line big corporate perspective—oppose any standards that are not voluntary.”).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017

306

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 38:2

of the Compact would be compromised by a number of design features.79 In particular, HRW emphasized the lack of a monitoring
and enforcement mechanism and the ambiguity of the standards
presented in the Compact.80 It also communicated its hope that the
Compact would not serve as a substitute for a legally binding instrument but instead serve as its precursor.81
Lack of credible enforcement mechanisms may have disappointed the NGO sector but that is how some industry actors preferred it. According to Maria Livanos Cattaui, secretary-general of
the ICC, “[b]usiness would look askance at any suggestion involving external assessment of corporate performance, whether by special interest groups or by UN agencies.”82 The ICC preferred to
honor the original vision of the Compact that did not involve any
monitoring or enforcement mechanisms.83 This view was consistent with the Compact’s self-image as an initiative that “is not
and does not aspire to be a legally-binding code of conduct.”84

79 Letter from Kenneth Roth, Exec. Dir., Human Rights Watch, to Kofi Annan,
Secretary-General, United Nations (July 28, 2000), https://www.hrw.org/
legacy/press/2000/07/hrw-ltr-july.htm [https://perma.cc/9LHS-BUW5] [hereinafter Letter from Roth to Annan].
80 Id.
81 Id. A few years later, a number of organizations expressed concern that the
UN Global Compact had become the exclusive regulatory instrument, albeit in
voluntary form, and may even exert chilling effects on regulatory alternatives. See
generally Peter Utting, The Global Compact: Why All the Fuss?, 40 UN CHRONICLE 65
(2003) (outlining both the positive and negative discussion of the Global Compact).
82 Maria Livanos Cattaui, Yes to Annan's 'Global Compact' If It Isn't a License to
Meddle, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/26/
opinion/26iht-edmaria.2.t.html [https://perma.cc/ZF4L-4U3V].
83 Nicole Winfield, UN Launches Partnership with Business, Environment and
Rights Groups, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 27, 2000; Jonathan Birchall, Annan Urges
Commitment to Ethical Business, FIN. TIMES (June 25, 2004), http://on.ft.com/
1nGhPVm [https://perma.cc/6FMU-N364] (“Businesses are wary of the introduction of any compliance element into the compact, while its rapid growth
means it lacks the resources to provide any system of enforcement.”).
84 Kell, Slaughter & Hale, supra note 74, at 29.
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4.2. Phase 2: The United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises
The United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (the “Norms”)
were drafted by a working group of the United Nations SubCommission on the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights.85
The Norms contained a number of features that concerned members of the transnational business community.
Vocal and persistent opposition came from two global trade associations: the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the
International Organization of Employers (IOE).86 The ICC was
founded in 1919 and based in Paris, France with membership ranks
that include thousands of companies from over 130 countries.87
Similarly, the IOE is the largest organization for employers with
135 members, including the United States Council for International
Business.88 Both the ICC and IOE were emphatic that the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights should reject the Norms.89
The common strain of their opposition concerned the “privatization of human rights.”90 By this phrase, the ICC and IOE feared
85 David Weissbrodt & Maria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97
AM. J. INT’L L 901, 905 (2003). See also Weissbrodt, supra note 78, at 381 (explaining
that the UN Sub-Commission consisted of twenty-six human rights experts from
twenty-six countries).
86 UN Observer & Int’l Report, Shell Leads International Business Campaign,
GLOBAL POLICY FORUM (Mar. 15, 2004), https://www.globalpolicy.org/
component/content/article/225/32247.html [https://perma.cc/23E7-CBQZ].
87 Direct Members, INT’L CHAMBER COM., http://www.iccwbo.org/worldwidemembership/members/direct-members/ [https://perma.cc/3LVW-CUPL] (last
visited Dec. 3, 2016); ICC Global Headquarters, INT’L CHAMBER COM.,
http://www.iccwbo.org/About-ICC/Organization/ICC-Headquarters/ICCGlobal-Headquarters/ [https://perma.cc/L38M-TZHY] (last visited Dec. 3, 2016).
88 IOE Members, INT’L ORG. EMPS., http://www.ioe-emp.org/ioe-members/
[https://perma.cc/7ZWU-23QN] (last visited Dec. 3, 2016).
89 INT’L CHAMBER OF COM., JOINT VIEWS OF THE IOE AND ICC ON THE DRAFT
“NORMS ON THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES WITH REGARD TO HUMAN RIGHTS” 2 (2003), http://www.ioeemp.org/fileadmin/ioe_documents/publications/Policy%20Areas/business_and
_human_rights/EN/(2003-11)%20Business%20and%20Human%20Rights%
20Draft%20Norms%20joint%20statement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JPL7-PWFA]
[hereinafter ICC & IOE, Joint Views on the Draft Norms].
90 Letter from Maria Livanos Cattaui, Secretary-General, Int’l Chamber of
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that the Norms would displace human rights duties from national
governments to private actors, such as transnational corporations.91
In a joint statement, the ICC and IOE explained that “[t]he essential problem with the draft Norms is that it privatises human
rights by making private persons (natural and legal) the dutybearers. Privatisation leaves the real-duty bearer – the State – out
of the picture. This will have profoundly negative consequences,
legal and practical.”92
The ICC and IOE insisted that the primary duty-bearers of human rights are governments, not corporations.93 They criticized
the Norms for not going far enough to ensure that governments
possessed the capacity to deliver on their human rights duties and
instead shifted this burden on to the transnational business sector.94
They were equally emphatic that transnational businesses
could not have human rights obligations under international law
but only under domestic laws:

Com., to Dzidek Kedzia, Office of the High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., United Nations 5 (Sept. 7, 2004) [hereinafter Letter from Cattaui to Kedzia].
91 Thomas Niles (President of the USCIB), UN Code No Help to Companies, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 2003; John Eaglesham, Business Calls for Action on Human Rights Liability Plan, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2004; Alison Maitland, Amnesty Hits Back at CBI
Stance on Human Rights Plans, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2004; ICC & IOE, Joint Views on
the Draft Norms, supra note 89, at 2 (“The Sub-Commission’s draft Norms is an extreme case of the ‘privatization of human rights.’ Among other things, it shifts
human rights duties from States to civil society actors.”). The IOE and ICC emphatically stressed this concern, even though Article 1 of the UN Global Norms
recognizes the distinct and separate roles of government versus business actors:
“States have the primary responsibility to promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of, and protect human rights recognised in international as
well as national law, including ensuring that transnational corporations and other
business enterprises respect human rights. Within their respective spheres of activity and influence, transnational corporations and other business enterprises
have the obligation to promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of,
and protect human rights recognized in international as well as national law, including the rights and interests of indigenous peoples and other vulnerable
groups.” Comm’n on Human Rights, Subcomm’n on the Promotion and Protect.
of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights art. 1, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003) [hereinafter UN Global Norms].
92 ICC & IOE, Joint Views on the Draft Norms, supra note 89, at 4.
93 Id. at 2–6.
94 Id. at 12; Niles, supra note 91.
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“Only States have legal obligations, so only States can fulfil human rights. And, conversely, only a State can violate
human rights. Private persons are not the duty-bearers of
the rights in the UN human rights treaties, and related
agreements: consequently, private actors cannot violate
human rights. A private actor can violate a national law
that a State has enacted to implement its international obligations: but a private person is not a ‘human rights violator,’ properly speaking.’”95
The privatization concern was not the only objection to the
Norms raised by the ICC, IOE, and other industry actors. They also objected to the lack of consultation between the drafters of the
Norms and other stakeholders, such as members of the business
community.96 Next, they objected to the way the Norms attempted
to impose direct obligations on corporations. In the words of Shell
Vice-President, Robin Aram, “It’s the packaging that business
doesn’t like. . . . The problem is the legalistic form that has been
used in drafting the Norms.”97
Shell was not alone. A number of other companies also preferred to leave corporations outside the domain of international obligations and instead to rely on voluntary initiatives and soft law
tools.98 David Vasella, former CEO of Swiss drug maker Novartis,
explicitly stated that he preferred the voluntary initiatives approach undertaken through the UN Global Compact to the
95 ICC & IOE, Joint Views on the Draft Norms, supra note 89, at 3 (emphasis
omitted).
96 David Kinley et al., The Politics of Corporate Social Responsibility: Reflections
on the United Nations Human Rights Norms for Corporations, 25 CO. & SEC. L.J. 30, 34
(2007). However, some commentators dispute the accuracy of this criticism,
pointing to a number of multi-stakeholder consultations such as the International
Business Leaders Forum and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development. Id. at 34–35. See Emily Rabin, In the Hot Seat: Shell VP Robin Aram, GREEN
BIZ (June 21, 2004), https://www.greenbiz.com/news/2004/06/21/hot-seatshell-vp-robin-aram [https://perma.cc/DQ46-PYKF] (explaining that Reebok and
Novartis participated in the first round of consultations on the Norms but that
Shell and the majority of companies did not); Weissbrodt, supra note 78, at 383
(noting that the subcommittee did reach out to businesses and corporations while
drafting the Norms).
97 Rabin, supra note 96 (internal quotations omitted).
98
Kinley, supra note 96, at 36.
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Norms.99 According to Vasella, “Our experience demonstrates that
voluntary standards work. But if the UN norms are adopted as
currently drafted - policed in ways that have yet to be defined, and
supported by financial sanctions - we too would have to reject
them.”100
The debate over the Norms ended in April 2004 with the decision of the UN Commission on Human Rights to subject the
Norms to additional study.101 The Commission requested the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights “to consult with
all the relevant stakeholders, and to compile a report analyzing the
Norms in light of the various existing initiatives and standards on
business and human rights.”102
Many business groups welcomed the decision.103 As a spokesperson for the ICC explained, “We’re very pleased with the outcome and more than happy to take part in an open discussion on
what business can contribute to promoting human rights.”104
4.3. Phase 3: The UN Global Compact Revisited and the United
Nations Guiding Principles on Business & Human Rights
The 2004 decision of the UN Commission on Human Rights
may have terminated the debate regarding the Norms, but it was
not the end of the business and human rights agenda. This Section
discusses how the business and human rights agenda adapted in
the years following that debate. Interestingly, business actors that
were set on ending the Norms adopted a more cooperative attitude
towards voluntary regulatory initiatives that were already in place
99 Daniel Vasella, Business Must Help Frame New Human Rights Rules, FIN.
TIMES (Apr. 8, 2004).
100 Id.
101 Kinley, supra note 96, at 32.
102 Id.
103 See Letter from Cattaui to Kedzia, supra note 90, at 2 (interpreting the UN
Commission’s decision to mean that “the draft prepared by the Sub-Commission
was not requested by the Commission, that as a draft it has no legal standing and
that the Sub-Commission should not perform any monitoring function with respect to the draft”).
104 Frances Williams, Human Rights to Stay on UN Agenda, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 21,
2014.
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or emerging. Therefore, the Norms still had important effects on
the voluntary regulation of business and human rights.
For example, in 2004—the year that the Norms were effectively
suspended—the number of new business signatories to the UN
Global Compact rose to new levels.105 In mid-2004, there were only
sixty-one American signatories to the Compact, but nearly a quarter of these signatories joined between March and July 2004.106
Every subsequent year, the number of new business signatories exceeded the pre-2004 rates.107 For example, 128 oil producing companies actively participate in the UN Global Compact; only twentytwo joined prior to 2004.108
The UN Global Compact was not the only voluntary initiative
to benefit from industry’s renewed interest. After the UN Commission on Human Rights tabled the Norms, the UN Secretary
General appointed John Ruggie as a Special Representative on
Business and Human Rights.109 Ruggie’s mandate was to “‘identify and clarify’ international standards and policies in relation to
business and human rights and to submit ‘views and recommendations’ for consideration by the commission.”110
In contrast to their hostility to the Norms, the ICC and the IOE
sought to engage with Ruggie on his mandate. The same trade associations that had opposed the Norms, fearing UN regulation
over business affairs, were now engaging with the UN’s Special
Representative on Business & Human Rights.111 The ICC and IOE
UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, ACTIVITY REPORT 2013, 6 (2014).
See Alexandra MacRae, More Firms Join UN Push to be Good Corporate Citizens, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (July 19, 2004), http://www.csmonitor.com/
2004/0719/p16s01-wmgn.html [https://perma.cc/97VM-D3Y6] (describing the
increased membership to the UN Global Compact initiative); Lisa Singhania,
American Firms Scarce At UN Forum on Ethics, BOSTON GLOBE (June 25, 2004),
http://archive.boston.com/business/globe/articles/2004/06/25/american_firms
_scarce_at_un_forum_on_ethics/?camp=pm
[https://perma.cc/27Q5-KHTQ]
(“Organizers say that American corporations are starting to sign on at a quicker
clip.”).
107 UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, supra note 105.
108 Id.
109 Giovanni Mantilla, Emerging International Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations, 15 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, 278, 289 (2009).
110 Id.
111 In their initial reactions to the mandate of the UN Special Representative,
the IOE and ICC stressed the importance of consultation with the business community. Letter from Guy Sebban, Secretary General, ICC, and Antonios Peñalosa,
105
106
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did this despite their firm position that the world does not need
another international framework on the subject of business and
human rights.112
In 2008, the UN Special Representative introduced his tripartite
framework for business and human rights known as the “Protect,
Respect, and Remedy Framework.”113 This framework consists of
three important but separate pillars: (a) the state’s duty to protect
against human rights abuses by third parties; (b) the corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and (c) greater access by victims to effective remedies, both judicial and non-judicial.114
The “corporate responsibility to respect” requires that companies refrain from infringing on the rights of others.115 This responsibility is centered around due diligence, understood as “a process
whereby companies not only ensure compliance with national laws
but also manage the risk of human rights harm with a view to
avoiding it.”116 A company’s responsibility for due diligence includes evaluating: (a) the “country contexts in which their business activities take place, to highlight any specific human rights
challenges they may pose”; (b) “human rights impacts their own
activities may have within that context - for example, in their capacity as producers, service providers, employers, and neighbours”; and (c) “whether they might contribute to abuse through
the relationships connected to their activities, such as with business
partners, suppliers, State agencies, and other non-State actors.”117
Secretary General, IOE, to John Ruggie, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for “business and human rights” 1 (Oct. 14, 2005) [hereinafter ICC &
IOE, Initial Views on the Mandate]. The IOE and the ICC were not the only ones
adopting a different attitude to voluntary initiatives. One commentator notes that
many of the governments that opposed the Norms are also staunch supporters of
the most important voluntary initiatives on business and human rights. See Mantilla, supra note 109 (noting the support of the governments of the United States
and the United Kingdom for the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human
Rights, as well as South Africa’s role in the Kimberley Process).
112 Letter from Cattaui to Kedzia, supra note 90, at 4 (“Therefore, the issue in
our view is not whether we need yet another initiative or standard on business
and human rights – we do not.”); ICC & IOE, Initial Views on the Mandate, supra
note 111, at 2.
113 Framework, supra note 35, at 6.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. ¶ 25
117 Id. ¶ 57
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Appropriate due diligence requires formulating a firm-specific
human rights policy, impact assessments, integration of the human
rights policy throughout the firm, and tracking performance
through monitoring and auditing.118
Despite these responsibilities, the ICC and IOE did not oppose
the Ruggie Framework as they had with the Norms.119 Joined by
the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD
(BIAC), they supported the due diligence approach to human
rights,120 even offering to identify a group of companies that could
serve as resource for the UN Special Representative on due diligence issues.121
4.4. Phase 4: The Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on
an international legally binding instrument on Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with respect to
human rights
On June 26, 2014, the United Nations Human Rights Council
adopted a resolution “to establish an open-ended intergovernmental working group with the mandate to elaborate an international
118 John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises), Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” Framework, 16, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar.
21, 2011) [hereinafter Ruggie, Guiding Principles]
119 See INT’L CHAMBER COM. ET AL., JOINT INITIAL VIEWS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATION OF EMPLOYERS (IOE), THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
(ICC) AND THE BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE OECD (BIAC)
TO THE EIGHTH SESSION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL ON THE THIRD REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 1 (2008), https://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/reportsand-materials/Letter-IOE-ICC-BIAC-re-Ruggie-report-May-2008.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/WY5E-H2XP] [hereinafter ICC ET AL., Joint Initial Views to the Eighth Session of the HRC] (discussing the ICC and IOE’s endorsement of the Ruggie Framework).
120 Id. at 2. See also Ruggie, Guiding Principles, supra note 118 (outlining the
requirements of due diligence).
121 INT’L CHAMBER COM. ET AL., Joint Views of the International Organisation of
Employers, the International Chamber of Commerce and the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD to the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General
on Business and Human Rights 1 (2009), [https://perma.cc/9K8T-6N6Z] [hereinafter ICC & IOE, Joint Views to the Special Representative].
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legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other
business enterprises with respect to human rights.”122 This resolution was drafted by Ecuador and South Africa and was supported
by twenty countries,123 opposed by another fourteen countries,124
with thirteen additional countries abstaining.125
The ICC was “disappointed” with the outcome of the resolution.126 It warned that “the adoption of a resolution for a binding
human rights treaty on multinational corporations will undermine
progress already made by the widely supported UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.”127 It reiterated its persistent fear that this treaty—like the Norms that preceded it—would
shift human rights obligations from states to the transnational
business sector.128
It concluded its initial reaction by reemphasizing its commitment to voluntary regulation under the
UN Guiding Principles.129
Following the first session of the Intergovernmental Working
Group on an international legally binding instrument on business
and human rights, the ICC submitted a joint statement with the
IOE, BIAC, and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD).130 The trade organizations emphasized the suc122 Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, Elaboration of an International Legally
Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1, at 2 (June
24, 2014).
123 Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, China, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Morocco, Namibia, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, South Africa, Venezuela, Vietnam. UN Human Rights Council Session, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RES. CTR. (2014), http://business-humanrights.org/
en/binding-treaty/un-human-rights-council-sessions [https://perma.cc/K6B5WZYT].
124 Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Montenegro, South Korea, Romania, Macedonia, UK, USA. Id.
125 Argentina, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Gabon, Kuwait, Maldives,
Mexico, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, UAE. Id.
126 ICC Disappointed by Ecuador Initiative Adoption, INT’L CHAMBER COM. (June
30, 2014), http://www.iccwbo.org/News/Articles/2014/ICC-disappointed-byEcuador-Initiative-adoption/ [https://perma.cc/7TVG-52YB].
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 INT’L CHAMBER COM. ET AL., UN TREATY PROCESS ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: INITIAL OBSERVATIONS BY THE INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS COMMUNITY ON A
WAY FORWARD 1 (2015) [hereinafter ICC ET AL., Initial Observations on a Way For-
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cesses with the implementation of the Guiding Principles on Business & Human Rights, which they identified as the “authoritative
international framework on business and human rights.”131 They
pointed to the influence of the Principles on industry operations,
“rang[ing] from public commitments on human rights policies, enhancement of governance mechanisms related to human rights, including efforts to improve understanding of impacts across diverse
functions and to undertake human rights due diligence in diverse
forms, as well as training programmes and capacity building both
within the company and with business partners.”132
While continuing to emphasize the role of government actors,
the initial comments by the trade associations did not take issue
with the idea of a legally binding instrument, per se. Instead, they
chose to comment on the substantive content of such an instrument.133 Specifically, the trade associations argued that aspects of
the UN Guiding Principles should be adopted within a new international treaty.134
One factor motivating the call for a treaty is the demand for accountability and remedies. In 2013, over 600 organizations spanning the world signed a joint statement emphasizing the need for
ward].
131 Id.; Press Release, Int’l Org. Emps., IOE Calls for Use of Existing Mechanisms in Discussion on UN Treaty Process on Business and Human Rights (June 7,
2015), http://www.ioe-emp.org/policy-areas/csr/csr-news-details/article/ioecalls-for-use-of-existing-mechanisms-in-discussion-on-un-treaty-process-onbusiness-and-human-rights/ [https://perma.cc/T23Q-UB73].
132 ICC ET AL., Initial Observations on a Way Forward, supra note 130, at 1.
133 See Oral Statement, International Organization of Employers, Open Debate on Different Approaches and Criteria for the Future Definition of the Scope
of the International Legally Binding Instrument (Oct. 27, 2016), https://businesshumanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/InternationalOrganization
Employers.doc [https://perma.cc/S8YU-ECTN] (arguing for a broad treaty scope
by explaining, “[T]o have an effective, international legally binding instrument, . .
. it is of fundamental importance that the scope of this treaty should include all
business enterprises, which means not only multinational enterprises, but also
state-owned enterprises and domestic enterprises.”).
134 Oral Statement, International Chamber of Commerce, The Relation Between the United Nations Guiding Principles and the Elaboration of an International Legally Binding Instrument on TNCs and Other Business Enterprises (Oct.
27, 2016) (https://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/
InternationalChamberCommerce.doc [https://perma.cc/VF63-JSAG] (“Any legally binding instrument should be based on the UNGPs’ three-pillar architecture.”).
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an international legally binding instrument on business and human rights.135 Part of their motivation was their belief in the need
“to ensure access to justice and remedy and reparations for victims
of corporate human rights abuse.”136 Consequently, they want a
treaty that “[p]rovides for an international monitoring and accountability mechanism” and “[r]equires States Parties to provide
for legal liability for business enterprises for acts or omissions that
infringe human rights.”137 As national courts close their doors to
corporate misconduct abroad, NGOs demand new and effective fora for the resolution of disputes involving toxic contamination,
building collapses, and even armed violence.138 The treaty’s supporters hope that it can provide access to remedies that are currently unavailable to many affected communities.139 For example, Ecuador’s Ambassador to the United Nations, H.E. Luis Gallegos
Chiriboga, stated that the resolution proposed by Ecuador and
South Africa “could level the playing field of victims deprived of a
voice for many years in search of corporate liability and accounta-

135 Joint Statement, Call for an International Legally Binding Instrument on
Human Rights, Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (Nov.
1, 2013), http://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/call-forbinding-instrument.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WSE-L2AA] (prepared during the
People’s Forum on Human Rights and Business in Bangkok, Thailand, Nov. 5–7,
2013) (calling for states to agree to enforce human rights obligations against businesses and to create an effective monitoring and accountability mechanism).
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 See, e.g., COOPÉRATION INTERNATIONALE POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT ET LA
SOLIDARITÉ, UN BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK: TIME TO OPEN

CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS TOWARDS DEVELOPING AN INTERNATIONAL LEGALLY
BINDING INSTRUMENT 3 (2015) (“By ratifying this instrument, a State would express

its consent to a new monitoring and enforcement mechanism applying directly to
the transnational corporations under its jurisdiction.”) (bold removed).
139 Press Release, Amnesty Int’l, All States Must Participate in Good Faith in
the UN Intergovernmental Working Group on Business and Human Rights 2
(June
18,
2015),
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/
IOR4018972015ENGLISH.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6Z8-QXS4]. See also CHRIS
ALBIN-LACKEY, HUM. RTS. WATCH, WITHOUT RULES: A FAILED APPROACH TO
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 4 (2013), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/
files/related_material/business.pdf [https://perma.cc/4E57-GWL4]. (“[W]ithout
any mechanism to ensure compliance or to measure implementation, they cannot
actually require companies to do anything at all. Companies can reject the principles altogether without consequence—or publicly embrace them while doing absolutely nothing to put them into practice.”).
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bility.”140
Access to remedies is not a unique feature of a potential treaty
on business and human rights. Instead, it is already recommended
under other regulatory approaches concerning business and human rights. Under Article 29 of the UN Guiding Principles, “business enterprises should establish or participate in effective operational-level grievance mechanisms for individuals and
communities who may be adversely impacted.”141 An operationallevel grievance mechanism is “accessible directly to individuals
and communities who may be adversely impacted by a business”
and “can engage the business enterprise directly in assessing the
issues and seeking remediation of any harm.”142 Businesses can
administer these mechanisms either independently or in collaboration with other stakeholders, such as NGOs.143 Corporations’ failure to make good on this requirement under voluntary regulation
may now drive NGO demands for better accountability through a
treaty.
4.5. Summary: Penumbral Effects
The Section below discusses whether the regulatory history
discussed above illustrates evidence of penumbral effects in practice.
4.5.1. Pre-emptive Penumbral Effects
The first type of penumbral effects are pre-emptive penumbral
effects. These occur when industry actors attempt to discourage
treaty regulation in a particular policy area by upgrading their current practices, especially voluntary regulation, in the prelude to a
140 H.E. Luis Gallegos Chiriboga, Human Rights Defenders: The Cornerstone for
the Development of an International Legally Binding Instrument in Business and Human
Rights, INT’L SERV. HUM. RTS. (Nov. 23, 2014), http://www.ishr.ch/news/statingcase-how-human-rights-defenders-can-gain-strengthened-implementation
[https://perma.cc/2ZZF-HC4H].
141 Ruggie, Guiding Principles, supra note 118, at 25.
142 Id.
143 Id.
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treaty. Extreme examples of pre-emptive effects occur when corporations intentionally self-regulate in order to pre-empt treaty
regulation.144 However, preemptive effects may also occur even
when the causation is less clear.
Those dissatisfied with voluntary regulation are looking to
treaty intervention through binding norms.145 One deficiency identified by treaty proponents is the inadequate access to remedies by
victims of human rights abuses by transnational corporations.146
But that situation may be changing. A number of corporations
adopted operational-level grievance mechanisms over the past few
years. In 2014, the Working Group on the issue of human rights
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises convened a workshop of experts to discuss non-judicial access to remedies.147 According to their report, although operational-level
grievance mechanisms are not yet mainstream, “[t]here is a general
impression that operational-level grievance mechanisms. . . . have
increased in number since the Guiding Principles were endorsed in
2011.”148
In 2013, a study on operational-level grievance mechanisms
performed by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) found that there was “a growing number of
grievance mechanisms in operation today.”149 According to the report, the proliferation of grievance mechanisms reflected both wider application and more purposeful and integrated use of the
grievance mechanisms.150 The report identified twenty companycommunity grievance mechanisms used by companies in the extractive sector, including BP, ExxonMobile, Rio Tinto, and NewSee notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
See notes 140–45 and accompanying text.
146 Id.
147 Rep. of the Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Report from an Expert Workshop entitled “Business Impacts and Non-Judicial Access to Remedy: Emerging Global
Experience” held in Toronto in 2013, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/25/Add.3 (Apr. 25,
2014).
148 Id. ¶ 17.
149 David Vermijs, Overview of Company-Community Grievance Mechanisms, in
DISPUTE OR DIALOGUE? COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES ON COMPANY-LED GRIEVANCE
MECHANISMS 14, 22 (Emma Wilson & Emma Blackmore eds., 2013).
150 Id.
144
145
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mont.151 This list was based on publicly available information, and
the authors, based on interviews with industry representatives, believe that the “total number is likely to be exponentially greater.”152
The report also found that “more companies, particularly in the extractive industries, are adopting far-reaching, companywide commitments to having grievance mechanisms in place at all of their
sites with substantial risks for community impacts.”153
Despite the suggestiveness of these signs, these developments
are not likely signals of preemptive effects in action. It does not
appear that industry actors are undertaking self-regulation in response to the threat of a treaty on business and human rights.154
The treaty threat is too remote and speculative given that the process has only begun and is at least ten years away. At a minimum,
these effects depend on states’ ability to signal capacity and willingness to employ treaty regulation. Recent challenges and failures of such regulation undermine the likelihood of these effects.
However, even if pre-emptive penumbral effects are absent, there
is support for the other forms of penumbral effects.
4.5.2. Coordination Penumbral Effects
Coordination effects refer to industry actors’ willingness to use
treaty, or prospective treaty, defaults as a basis for coordinated
voluntary action. This responsiveness can take the form of support
or opposition by industry actors to treaty regulation.
For example, the regulatory threat of the Global Norm was
most apparent to industry between 2003–2004 when the ICC and
the IOE opposed the development of the Norms.155 Even if industry ultimately won out, they expended considerable resources in
opposing the Norms.156 The magnitude of the opposition is a testament to the severity of the risk. The UN Global Norms did exert
reputational costs on those industry actors who opposed the
151
152
153
154
155
156

Id. at 23.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 24.
Telephone Interview with International Policy Advisor, supra note 64.
See supra notes 91–101 and accompanying text.
See id.
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Norms. In the words of former Shell VP Robin Aram, “‘This episode . . . has not been without damage to business. It has linked
business with a perception of hostility to human rights.’”157
This damage caused by the debate over the Norms may have
contributed to industry attitudes and engagement with the Ruggie
Principles in the wake of the Norms. The ICC and IOE engaged
with Ruggie Tripartite Framework and the UN Guiding Principles
in a very different manner compared to their hostility to the Global
Norms.158 With the Ruggie Framework, the industry associations
desired engagement and consultation and even offered their services with data collection and information dissemination.159 The
ICC, IOE, and BIAC volunteered to collaborate with the UN Special Representative on implementing the third pillar of the Ruggie
Framework: access to remedies.160 Specifically, they offered to
“identify a small number of companies from relevant sectors that
would test pilot these Principles at plant or project level and disseminate the results as part of the learning experience.”161 Interestingly, the Norms had also contained a similar requirement that
transnational corporations and other business enterprises “provide
prompt, effective, and adequate reparation to those persons, entities, and communities that have been adversely affected by failures
to comply with these Norms.”162 Despite their opposition to the
Norms, industry actors seemed more receptive to the remedy provisions of the Ruggie Framework and the UN Guiding Principles.
These statements of support were not empty promises by the
trade associations. Over an eight week period in 2012, the ICC and
IOE, in collaboration with other organizations, disseminated a pilot
survey project throughout their business networks in order to assess the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles.163 The surRabin, supra note 96.
See supra notes 124–26 and accompanying text.
159 Id.
160 ICC & IOE, Joint Views to the Special Representative, supra note 121.
161 Id.
162 UN Global Norms, supra note 91, art. 18. One reason that the trade associations may have supported the move to provide remedies is to discourage the extra-territorial application of laws. ICC ET AL., Joint Initial Views to the Eighth Session
of the HRC, supra note 119, at 2.
163 Working Group on Business & Human Rights, Report of Pilot Business
Survey on Implementation of the Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human
157
158

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss2/1

2017]

TREATY PENUMBRAS

321

vey was intended to identify current approaches and practices
within different sectors (such as awareness of human rights, policy
commitment, capacity development, policy integration, and reporting), as well as identifying obstacles to implementation.164
In 2015, IPIECA, the global oil and gas industry association for
environmental and social issues, produced a manual for implementing operational-level grievance mechanisms in the oil and gas
industry.165 This manual was based on the practical experiences of
seven pilot operational-level community grievance mechanisms
conducted by IPIECA member companies, as well as shared learning from additional IPIECA members and stakeholder engagement.166 Moreover, this manual uses the effectiveness criteria provided in the UN Guiding Principles on Business & Human Rights
as the benchmarks for implementing successful community-level
grievance mechanisms.167
Some may view these examples as evidence of the success of
soft law regulation over other forms of regulation. However, it is
important to view different types of regulation as part of the same
narrative. The combination of voluntary initiatives and binding
regulation facilitate results difficult to obtain through either alone.
It is important to highlight points of contemporaneous development by also examining the negative spaces—the treaties that did
not emerge and the voluntary initiatives that floundered. These
negative spaces reveal the importance of not only examining regulatory methods that succeeded but also those that failed and placing both developments in context. When situated such, both sets
of developments tend to overlap. The regulatory history of business and human rights is not a testament to the triumph of voluntary initiatives over other regulatory forms. Instead, the milestones
Rights 2 (Dec. 2, 2012), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/
ForumSession1/Report_UNWGBusinessSurvey_Dec2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ZK8W-LT7C].
164 Id. at 3.
165 See generally IPIECA, COMMUNITY GRIEVANCE MECHANISMS IN THE OIL AND
GAS INDUSTRY: MANUAL FOR IMPLEMENTING OPERATIONAL-LEVEL GRIEVANCE
MECHANISMS AND DESIGNING CORPORATE FRAMEWORKS (2015) (providing a practical guide to aid planning and implementing operational-level community grievance mechanisms).
166 Id. at 2.
167 Id. at 3.
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reached may partially result from the failed regulatory strategies,
like the Norms, that also litter this history.
4.5.3. Noise Penumbral Effects
The noise created by the treaty process can also precipitate industry reform. Specifically, this noise creates pressure for reform
of current business practices, awareness of policy issues and weaknesses with self-regulation and reputational shaming. These effects relate to coordination effects and can provide the stimulus for
the latter.
According to a policy advisor for a large transnational corporation, it is unlikely that many corporations will engage in internal
reform of corporate practices concerning business and human
rights without this noise.168 The combined attention on the importance of access to remedies—an issue particularly publicized by
proponents of a treaty on business and human rights—provides
external pressure for internal change within corporations.169
Critically, these productive noise effects are not unique to a
treaty consultation and negotiation process. Voluntary initiatives,
such as the UN Global Compact and UN Guiding Principles, also
displayed similar features by increasing awareness of important
policy issues and recommending strategies for improvement.
These features are also shared by other enforcement strategies such
as activist litigation. For example, the wave of human rights litigation in federal courts under the Alien Tort Statute created public
awareness of transnational business practices. The complaints
filed by plaintiffs documented serious human rights violations involving well known multinational corporations in the United
States and abroad. Such litigation exposed named corporations
and their associated industries to public scrutiny and shaming.
This litigation threat continues even after Kiobel v. Dutch Petroleum.170 Lawsuits continue to serve as a driver for industry selfregulation, especially concerning the provision of remedies and
168
169
170

Telephone Interview with International Policy Advisor, supra note 64.
Id.
133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
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non-judicial grievance mechanisms.171 For example, lawsuits
against Nestle, Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), and Cargill alleging forced labor and torture formed the background for the cocoa
industry to adopt voluntary initiatives in these policy areas.172
Similar initiatives to address modern day slavery in the shrimp
supply chains are receiving a lot of attention because of recent lawsuits filed against Nestle and Costco.173
Therefore, what matters is the collective creation of pressure
points, such as increased public awareness and brand shaming.
These pressure points can arise from the attention around a consultation process for a new treaty but can similarly accompany the introduction of new multi-stakeholder initiatives or the filing of a
lawsuit against an industry actor.
What all these sources have in common is the aggregation of
leverage by non-state actors vis-à-vis large corporations. States
possess unique sources of leverage over corporations that non-state
actors do not possess. Unfortunately, these state sources have
proven inadequate to address all forms of transnational corporate
wrongdoing. The history of business and human rights is also a
history of a range of non-state actors attempting to affect business
behavior. Individually, these actors do not possess the coercive
qualities of state actors. Collectively, however, they can aggregate
their own particular forms of leverage (NGO reports, media publicity, consumer boycotts, domestic litigation) to increase aware171 Telephone Interview with Mil Niepold, Senior Mediator (Sept. 8, 2015)
[hereinafter September 8 Interview].
172 Id. See also Pettersson & Burnson, supra note 4 (“In 2001, Nestle and other
top chocolate makers and cocoa processors agreed to a plan to investigate and end
child slave-labor practices on farms in West Africa that supplied them with cocoa.
The industry collaboration followed media reports that boys as young as 11 were
sold or tricked into slavery to harvest cocoa beans on some of the Ivory Coast’s
600,000 farms.”).
173 September 8 Interview, supra note 171. See also Pettersson & Burnson, supra note 4 (reporting that Nestle was sued because of claims that its “Fancy Feast”
cat food contained fish from a supplier that uses slave labor and that purchasers
of the pet food would not have purchased the food had they known of the purchasing practices). Erik Larson, Costco Sued Over Claims Shrimp Harvested With
Slave Labor, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2015-08-19/costco-sued-over-claims-shrimp-is-harvested-withslave-labor [https://perma.cc/LQ48-7RPM] (reporting that Costco was sued for
purchasing prawns from Thailand, where they are caught by unpaid forced laborers, and misrepresenting its supply chain to consumers).
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ness of harmful practices, recommend strategies for improvement,
and shame recalcitrant corporations.174 Such leverage may be varied and indirect but may prove as, or even more, effective as traditional state regulation over business actors.
*

*

*

The lessons of this case study are important for at least two audiences. First, those advocating for a new treaty on business and
human rights should pay particular attention to the past in order to
understand the non-traditional functions of treaty negotiations and
to recognize treaty penumbras. This understanding reveals the
importance of voluntary regulation through this process. It suggests that those actors consulting, drafting, and negotiating a draft
treaty should undertake these functions with an eye towards
achieving these penumbral effects as second best options. These
implications thereby transform the treaty negotiation process from
single-objective (outcome based, focused on developments in formal treaty process) to a dual-objective that also considers the effects of the treaty process on industry actors.
Second, these lessons are also potentially relevant for actors
negotiating treaties in other contexts. This case study focused on
the policy area of business and human rights in order to provide an
in-depth analysis of the regulatory history in this area. This focus
does not mean that penumbral effects are limited to issues of business and human rights. Instead, these findings are consistent with
industry practices in a variety of policy areas in the domestic context.175 Further empirical research may reveal analogous regulatory histories for other international policy areas as well. The objective of this article is to illustrate penumbral effects in one policy
area that can illuminate further research on the role of treaties in
the regulation of other policy issues.

174 See Kishanthi Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 WASH. L.
REV. 747, 797–801 (2014) (describing how non-state actors, using the “reflexive coordination” approach and “recogniz[ing] the varied pressure points offered by
other actors,” can coordinate their behavior to exercise leverage over a specific industry to facilitate an adjustment in behavior).
175 See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
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IMPLICATIONS OF PENUMBRAL EFFECTS

Penumbral effects matter because these effects can facilitate
treaty objectives even when a treaty does not emerge or does not
perform as expected. Treaty proponents can encourage their desired changes by monitoring and engaging in the penumbral effects of the treaty or treaty process on voluntary regulation. These
effects are not apparent under the classic lens of public international law that focuses on state behavior. Instead, penumbral effects occur off-stage in the realm of private ordering, but they can
still be significant. Moreover, these effects concern the very changes that many treaties are ultimately attempting to achieve: behavior by business organizations. It is therefore important to include
these effects in any assessment of the goals of a treaty process or
evaluation of its results. The following section describes ways that
treaty proponents and policymakers can operationalize penumbral
effects strategically. It also identifies implications of penumbral effects policymakers may need to consider.
5.1. Maximizing the Noise Effects: Shareholders as Intermediaries
If the threats to treaty-making are significant, then pre-emptive
penumbral effects are unlikely; instead, we will need to rely more
on noise and coordination effects.176 Unfortunately, treaty negotiations take a long time and a firm’s management is unlikely to pay
particular attention to the distant noise of a prospective treaty that
is too remote and speculative; these are precisely the reasons that
firms do not fear a prospective treaty on business and human
rights.177 But noise is dynamic, and there are important strategies
for amplifying that noise. If firms will not pay attention to a distant treaty, and the policy noise surrounding it, then policy makers
should use the treaty process to get the attention of actors who firm
representatives will not ignore: shareholder intermediaries.
Some shareholders, such as institutional investors, are already
176 See supra Section 3 (discussing the calibration between penumbral effects
and threats to treaty making).
177 Telephone Interview with International Policy Advisor, supra note 64.
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urging large corporations to conform their corporate policies to international human rights standards.178 This behavior is part of a
phenomenon that Virginia Harper Ho describes as “risk-related activism,” which refers to the “exercise of shareholder governance
rights to motivate firms to effectively monitor, manage, and disclose risk, including nonfinancial environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks.”179 Human rights, and other ESG issues, are
important because they can “impact a firms’ financial performance,
such as corporate governance, labor and employment standards,
human resource management, and environmental practices.”180
Even if firms ignore treaty noise, some shareholders pay attention to international human rights standards—both “formal” treaty
norms and non-binding norms from soft law guidelines and even
“failed” treaties. For example, the UN Global Norms re-emerged
in an unlikely setting: a 2014 shareholder proposal submitted by a
group of religiously affiliated shareholders to the corporate executives of Caterpillar.181 This proposal referenced the Norms and
urged Caterpillar’s leadership to review and modify its internal
corporate policies to bring them in line with international human
rights standards articulated in other sources, such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the core labor
standards of the International Labour Organization, and the International Covenant on Economic, Cultural, and Social Rights.182
Shareholder actions like these amplify the penumbral noise effects of international standards by using the latter as reference
points for corporate reform. In the Caterpillar example, shareholders demanded change by using a shareholder proposal under Rule
14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.183 This rule allows
178 INST. S’HOLDER SERVS., 2014 PROXY SEASON REVIEW: ENVIRONMENTAL &
SOCIAL ISSUES 6 (2014).
179 Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism, 41 J. CORP. L. 647, 650–51
(2016).
180 Id. at 651.
181 Caterpillar Inc., Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 67–68 (May 1, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/18230/000001823014000144/def14a
_2014xproxyxv25.htm [https://perma.cc/35HW-WVFB].
182 Id. at 67.
183 Ho, supra note 179, at 661 (noting that shareholder proposals have “historically been the most widely used and least expensive means of shareholder activism”).
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qualifying investors to submit a proposal to the company that it
wants included in the annual meeting of the shareholders.184
Shareholder proposals often serve to signal to management that
the shareholders want to start a conversation on a particular topic.185 Once a shareholder proposal is received, a company’s management may be required to include an eligible proposal in its
proxy statement that is distributed to all shareholders before the
next annual shareholder meeting, possibly with an accompanying
statement of opposition.186
This proposal is not alone. According to Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), a private proxy advisor, shareholders filed
more resolutions concerning environmental and social standards
than corporate governance in 2014; this had not occurred since the
1980s.187 There was also an increase in the number of resolutions
concerning human rights with sixteen resolutions demanding improved human rights risk assessments.188 Additionally, the resolutions that were voted upon received relatively high levels of shareholder support.189
These examples of shareholder action magnify penumbral
noise effects in two important ways. First, Rule 14a-8 allows activist shareholders to disseminate policy recommendations and international norms among the corporation’s shareholders using the
proxy statement; this tool allows shareholders to learn of international norms when they otherwise may not. Second, management
may also meet and negotiate a withdrawal of the proposal by the
shareholders.190 These withdrawals are also significant. They signal that management and the shareholders submitting a proposal
may have reached a privately negotiated agreement regarding
company practices going forward.191 In these agreements, a firm’s
representatives set out commitments regarding how the business
Id.
Id.
186 Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private Ordering of
Public Elections, 126 Yale L. J. 262, 266 (2016).
187 INST. S’HOLDER SERVS., supra note 178, at 1.
188 Id. at 37.
189 Id. at 38.
190 Haan, supra note 186, at 279-80..
191 See id.
184
185
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will operate in the future. For example, in the campaign finance
context, “at least thirty-one proposal settlements set campaign finance disclosure standards at U.S. public companies” between
2014–2015.192 In light of this trend, Sarah Haan claims that shareholder proposal settlements offer a promising avenue for reforming corporate social and environmental policies.193
Privately negotiated settlements demonstrate ways that shareholders enforce public norms. Those desiring improved human
rights practices by corporations may want to employ a similar
strategy to achieve corporate reform. Under such a strategy, investors will “short-cut” the pathway from non-binding international
human rights standards to corporate policies by serving as both
audiences and enforcers of these human rights standards. This
demonstrates yet another way that private intermediaries can amplify “failed treaties” or other non-binding standards.
5.2. Iterative Upgrading of the Baseline
Change is a challenging task for both voluntary regulation and
public regulation. The history discussed in Section 4, supra, suggests that the interaction between the two forms of regulation upgrades the baseline between cycles of each. Section 4, supra, discusses at least two cycles of both voluntary regulation and
attempted public regulation in the area of business and human
rights. These cycles suggest that change is a product of both and
not a consequence of only one. Industry reacts to both in each cycle. When one cycle ends and another begins, the starting point for
the conversation is a little different.194
History may not repeat itself with the debate about an international legally binding instrument on business and human rights.
As before, industry opposes it, but the nature of the opposition is
different. Part of industry’s opposition to the Norms was its

Id. at 285.
Id. at 266-67. See id. at 265 (“Although reform of campaign finance disclosure has stalled in Congress and at various federal agencies, disclosure reform is
steadily unfolding in a firm-by-firm program of private ordering.”).
194 Kinley, supra note 96 at 31.
192
193
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“packaging” in legalistic form.195 A number of industry actors preferred to leave business and human rights outside the realm of legally binding instruments.196
This time around, the IOE, as a representative of the global
business community, does not ignore the work of the intergovernmental group and instead seeks engagement with the treaty
process.197 This is in sharp contrast to industry’s aloofness to the
preparation of the UN Global Norms.198 Second, the ICC, IOE, and
other industry representatives appear as engaged with the substance of an international treaty as its existence.199 In their first set of
initial observations, these industry actors provide specific recommendations on the content of a treaty or international initiative on
business and human rights.200
There are a few explanations for this engagement. First, industry may be interested in the substantive content of a treaty in order
to limit their exposure. Second, and as a related point, industry actors may desire to preserve their inclusion in the consultation process. One of the key reasons that industry actors were more receptive to the Ruggie Framework and the Guiding Principles
compared to the Global Norms was because of the consultation
process used with the former.201 They may desire at least the appearance of cooperation in order to avoid subsequent ostracism, as
occurred with the international regulation of tobacco.202 Activists

Id. at 36; Vasella, supra note 99.
Kinley, supra note 96, at 36; Vasella, supra note 99.
197 IOE Roundup of Proceedings of the IWG on UN Treaty on Business & Human
Rights, INT’L ORG. EMPS. (July 13, 2015), http://www.ioe-emp.org/index.php?
id=2464 [https://perma.cc/G3WQ-E8ZK] (noting that the IOE participated in the
intergovernmental working group’s first session and that it planned to continue
its engagement in the treaty-making process).
198 Rabin, supra note 96 (noting that the majority of companies chose not to
engage in the UN Global Norms consultation process); Weissbrodt, supra note 78,
at 383.
199 ICC ET AL., Initial Observations on a Way Forward, supra note 130, at 1 (advocating for a treaty or “international initiative” that covers all companies, requires States to develop National Action Plans, and avoids new legal liabilities for
companies along global supply chains, among other suggestions).
200 Id.
201 September 8 Interview, supra note 171 (explaining the credibility of the
Ruggie Principles and the consultation process involved).
202 See WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, art. 5.3, Feb. 27,
195
196
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have called on similar bans against industry in treaty talks concerning climate change203 and also business and human rights.204
As always, it is difficult to pinpoint the causes of these changes
in industry attitudes, but it is important to note the differences.
These differences are productive because it means that the conversation regarding important, but controversial, international policy
issues has a different starting point at the beginning of each cycle.
Certain assumptions are no longer contested, and the parties may
move on to new challenges. As a result, parties, even antagonistic
ones, may begin at a slightly different starting point compared to
previous years, even if they are once again polarized regarding the
desirability or content of a new regulation in a particular issue area.
5.3. Treaties as Process vs. Treaties as Products
A treaty process is successful not only if it results in a binding
treaty entering into force—“treaties as products”—but also if it can
facilitate voluntary compliance with socially desirable goals consistent with the treaty in development. One issue concerns whether there is tension between “treaties as process” versus “treaties as
products.” Actors desiring to maximize the beneficial regulatory
effects of “treaties as process” may pursue particular strategic
2005, 2302 U.N.T.S. 166, http://www.who.int/fctc/text_download/en/
[https://perma.cc/Q846-CDWP] (providing for the regulation of tobacco). See
also WHO FCTC, GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 5.3 OF THE WHO
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION 2–9 (2008), http://www.who.int/fctc/guidelines/
article_5_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/LG38-9GG6] (listing guidelines unfavorable to
the tobacco industry and specifying how outside parties should interact with the
tobacco industry in order to promote public health policies).
203 Open Letter Calling for Rules to Protect the Integrity of Climate Policy-Making
from Vested
Corporate Interests,
CORP. EUROPE (Nov.
21,
2013),
http://corporateeurope.org/blog/open-letter-calling-rules-protect-integrityclimate-policy-making-vested-corporate-interests
[https://perma.cc/URU7K8SZ] (showing that more than seventy-five civil society organizations had
signed on to the open letter calling on the U.N. to protect environmental policy
negotiations from the fossil fuel industry’s influence).
204 See Bobby Ramakant, What Can We Learn from Industry Interference around
the Global Tobacco Treaty?, BUS. & HUM. RTS. RES. CTR: BLOG (July 23, 2015),
http://business-humanrights.org/en/what-can-we-learn-from-industryinterference-around-the-global-tobacco-treaty [https://perma.cc/M4XF-GM4A]

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss2/1

2017]

TREATY PENUMBRAS

331

choices that reduce the likelihood that an actual treaty (“treaty as
product”) may eventually result from the process.
One strategic factor that aids “treaties as process” but may impede “treaties as products” is transparency. A strategy that attempts to maximize the noise from a treaty process may depend on
a certain level of transparency regarding the treaty process in order
for the signaling function to work. For example, industry actors
may need to know how quickly the treaty process is moving along
in order to gauge its regulatory threat. Similarly, the content of a
prospective treaty may influence external actors regarding voluntary self-regulation but only if these actors have some awareness of
this content.
These “spillover effects” of a prospective treaty process are dependent upon a certain degree of transparency. The challenge is
that lack of transparency is often the norm in treaty negotiations.
For example, in July 2015, treaty negotiators drew the ire of politicians and civil society actors regarding their confidentiality policies
concerning the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP).205 The European Commission released a new rule restricting politicians’ access to the text to a secure “reading room” in
Brussels.206 These rules were adopted in order to protect the process against leaks that could undermine the negotiations process.
The “reading room” rule was adopted after a series of leaks had
occurred.207 According to news sources, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) also had a “similar super-secure reading room.”208 This
is one example of tension between choices facilitating “treaties as
process” versus “treaties as products,” but there may be other factors that promote the former to the neglect of the other.

205 See Zachary Davies Boren, TTIP Controversy: Secret Trade Deal Can Only Be
Read in Secure ‘Reading Room’ in Brussels, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 17, 2015),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ttip-controversy-secrettrade-deal-can-only-be-read-secure-in-reading-room-in-brussels-10456206.html
[https://perma.cc/7XS2-AWLF] (detailing the additional security measures put
into place after several leaks threatened the confidentiality of the TTIP text).
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 See id. (quoting Robert Smith, host of NPR’s Planet Money).
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5.4. Thick Treaties, Thin Treaties
Penumbral effects are external effects of the treaty or the treatymaking process. This article elaborated on a few types of penumbral effects, but this is not an exhaustive list. Much of this discussion related to the importance of penumbral effects for treaties that
may never emerge for many of the reasons discussed in Section 2.2.
Further research could explore factors that amplify the penumbral
effects of treaties in force. Here is why it matters: penumbral effects may partially compensate for institutional features of treaties.
In this context, penumbral effects concern what kind of institutional features that a treaty will possess.
These types of penumbral effects are not equally significant for
all treaties. Some treaties are rich in institutional features, including well-developed enforcement mechanisms. In these situations,
penumbral effects may not be as important because the treaty’s design features are already robust and address important issues, such
as enforcement. External institutional features may facilitate compliance, but the treaty itself provides incentives for actor compliance. Penumbral effects are only important here when these design features are compromised or ineffective.
Other treaties, however, are “thinner” with fewer institutional
features. This can become a problem when this institutional profile
results from lack of cooperation: the treaty is thin not because
that’s what the parties wanted but because it was what they could
agree upon. For example, a treaty that could have benefited from
an enforcement mechanism may have lost it during the treaty negotiation process as a compromise between the parties or because
the parties could not agree on the features of the enforcement
mechanism. In these situations, penumbral effects can partially
compensate for the institutional weaknesses of the treaty’s design
or operation. Penumbral effects may offer incentives for compliance that are lacking or inadequate in the treaty itself. In this way,
these penumbral effects provide hybrid institutional features that
may even resemble the institutional features of thicker, institutionally developed treaties.
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6. CONCLUSION
This article introduced the concept of “treaty penumbras” to
explain how treaties exert indirect effects on businesses. Penumbras are important because they illuminate how a treaty may still
succeed even if it is failing under a statist framework. Specifically,
the treaty process generates positive penumbral effects within the
realm of voluntary industry regulation that can incentivize improved business behavior. In this way, penumbral effects can partially compensate for treaties that fail to live up to our expectations.
That is why it is important to account for penumbral effects when
we evaluate treaty success.
Penumbras illustrate how the treaty process can be as important as the treaty product that the process is intended to
achieve. However, penumbral effects do not substitute for treaty
regulation; instead, these effects are dependent upon treaty regulation in general even if these effects can compensate for failed treaty
regulation in a specific policy area. If treaty making is robust, all
three forms of penumbral effects (preemptive, noise, and coordination) can foster improved business behavior. However, if treaty
making is declining or non-existent, the possibilities for penumbral
effects also decline, especially preemptive effects. We may expect
noise and coordination effects even in this situation, but these effects may also disappear if all treaty making declines too substantially. In other words, penumbral effects offer hope in a world of
dwindling treaties but they also vanish in a world without treaties.
The implications in the article arose from a close examination
of only one international policy area. This examination yields insight that is significant for the hundreds of NGOs, labor unions, religious organizations, government officials, and industry representatives who are invested in the outcome of the treaty process
concerning business and human rights. These implications are also
relevant to treaty negotiations that similarly target business conduct. Additional empirical research may reveal similar penumbras
in other international policy areas that policymakers can use to reinforce other treaty norms.
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